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NOTES 
When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess 
Appointments Clause? 
Michael A. Carrier 
INTRODUCTION 
Two weeks before leaving office, President George Bush found 
himself in a quandary. The President wanted the Board of Gover-
nors of the U.S. Postal Service1 to withdraw a lawsuit it had filed.2 
The Board, however, by a six-to-five margin, refused to comply 
with his demands.3 The President then threatened to dismiss the 
governors who supported the suit,4 but the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia granted an injunction preventing Bush 
from removing any of the govemors.5 
The President nonetheless continued to pursue his goal. He 
waited until a recess of the Senate6 to replace one of the governors 
who supported the suit, Crocker Nevin, with Thomas Ludlow 
Ashley,7 a longtime friend who Bush believed would oppose the 
suit.8 Bush thus skirted the usual procedure for presidential ap-
pointments, in which the Senate must confirm the President's nomi-
1. Congress established the Postal Service as an "independent establishment of the exec-
utive branch." 39 U.S.C. § 201 {1988). 
2. The Board had filed a suit seeking to overturn a two-cent discount for machine-
processed first-class mail offered by the Postal Rate Commission. See Bush Defies Judge and 
Names New Member to Postal Board, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1993, at 10. The President claimed 
that the Board of Governors could not file a suit without the approval of the Justice Depart· 
ment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected Bush's argu-
ment, holding that the Postal Service may file suit when the Department of Justice declines to 
represent or to consent to the self-representation of the Postal Service. Mail Order Assn. of 
Am. v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See generally Neal 
Devins, Tempest in an Envelope: Reflections on the Bush White House's Failed Takeover of 
the U.S. Postal Service, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1035 {1994). 
3. Bush Defies Judge and Names New Member to Postal Board, supra note 2, at 10. 
4. Id. 
5. Mackie v. Bush, 809 F. Supp. 144, 148 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated as moot sub nom. Mackie 
v. Clinton, No. 93-5001, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 33466 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 27, 1993). 
6. The Senate was in recess from January 7, 1993, until January 20, 1993. 139 CoNo. REc. 
S53 {daily ed. Jan. 7, 1993). 
7. Digest of Other White House Announcements, 29 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 27, 29 
(Jan. 8, 1993) [hereinafter Bush White House Announcements]. See Bush Defies Injunction; 
Names Friend to Postal Service Board, CHI. Tms., Jan. 9, 1993, at 15; Bill McAllister, Recess 
Appointments: A Disputed Matter of Timing, WASH. PoST, July 19, 1993, at A13. 
8. Devins, supra note 2, at 1047; Bill McAllister, Bush-Postal Board Flap Leaves 1 Chair 
Empty, WASH. PoST, Feb. 2, 1993, at Al9. 
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nee,9 by making a "recess appointment," which does not require 
confirmation by the Senate. The Recess Appointments Clauselo of 
the Constitution allows the President unilaterally to fill vacancies in 
federal offices11 that happen12 during Senate recesses, thereby cre-
ating commissions that last until the end of the next nine-to-twelve-
month session of the Senate.13 Justifying his attempt to employ this 
power, the President argued that Nevin's "holdover"14 position ·on 
the Board constituted a "vacancy" that he could fill by making a 
recess appointment.15 The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, however, invalidated Bush's appointment, holding that 
no vacancy existed on the Board, and therefore, that Bush could 
9. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 provides the usual procedure for appointments: "[The 
President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall ap-
point Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all 
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided 
for, and which shall be established by Law." U.S. CoNST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. For more detail 
about this process, see infra note 27. 
10. "The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the 
Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next 
Session." U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
11. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 defines the array of offices to which the President can 
make recess appointments. See supra note 9. The Supreme Court has stated that "any ap-
pointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Of-
ficer of the United States.' " Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976); see also Hoeppel v. 
United States, 85 F.2d 237, 241 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that any person "appointed in any of the 
modes prescribed in article II, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution" is an officer of the United 
States), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 557 (1936). Congress may vest the appointment of inferior 
officers solely in the President. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[T]he Congress may by Law 
vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, 
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."). 
Of all these offices, the judiciary poses an unique problem. Recess-appointing judges may 
well compromise their independence, as they may make decisions with an eye to garnering 
the approval of a president who may later offer them a permanent appointment or of a 
Senate who would confirm that permanent appointment. This poses a constitutional problem 
because a recess appointee lacks the life tenure demanded by Article III. Although this 
subject is beyond the scope of this Note, it has been explored in several student Notes. See, 
e.g., Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article Ill Courts: The Use of Histori-
cal Practice in Constitutional Interpretations, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 1758 (1984); Note, Recess 
Appointments to the Supreme Court - Constitutional But Unwise?, 10 STAN. L. REv. 124 
(1957). 
12. Courts and commentators have considered whether the term "happen" in the clause's 
text, "Vacancies that may happen during the Recess," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3, includes 
vacancies that initially arose when the Senate was in session. The apparent consensus is that 
vacancies that "happen" during a recess include those vacancies that carry over into the re-
cess, in addition to those that initially occur during a recess. See infra note 148. 
13. For an explanation of the determination of lengths of commissions granted under the 
clause, see infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. 
14. The Postal Reorganization Act, as amended, contains a holdover provision by which 
an outgoing officer remains in office for up to one year beyond the expiration of his term 
until "his successor has qualified." A successor "qualifies" when the President nominates, 
and the Senate confirms, a successor. Act of Aug. 23, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-81, § 2, 97 Stat. 
487, 487 (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1988)). See infra note 220. 
15. See Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56, 58 (D.D.C. 1993). 
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not make a recess appointment.16 
Although the court ultimately struck down Ashley's appoint-
ment, the controversy highlights presidents' increasing use of the 
Recess Appointments Clause as a means of evading the require-
inent that the Senate confirm federal officers.17 The Framers 
adopted the clause apparently to keep the government functioning 
during the six-:to-nine month recesses in which Senators were dis-
persed throughout the country and were unable to convene to pro-
vide their advice and consent.18 Throughout history, presidents 
have used the clause almost exclusively during intersession recesses, 
which are recesses occurring between two formal sessions of a Sen-
ate.19 Intersession recesses have varied in length from the six-to-
nine-month recesses of the early nineteenth century to the one-to-
16. The court found that "Governor Nevin holds and occupies the office of Governor 
through December 8, 1993, unless he dies, resigns, is lawfully removed or some 'successor has 
qualified,' i.e., has been nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate." Mackie, 
827 F. Supp. at 57-58 (footnote omitted). 
Throughout the controversy, neither Nevin nor Ashley attended Board meetings. See 
Court Clears the Way to End Postal Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1993, at A27. After the 
district court's ruling, Nevin regained his seat on the Board of Governors. When Nevin's 
holdover commission expired, President Clinton nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Einar 
Dyhrkopp to take Nevin's position. 139 CONG. Rr:c. D1360 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993). 
In addition to avoiding the Senate's confirmation, Bush's appointment would have al-
lowed recess appointee Ashley to remain in office without being subject to removal by Con-
gress for twice as long as the Postal Act's holdover provision permitted. The Postal Act 
allowed Nevin to remain in power for one year beyond the end of his nine-year term, until 
December 8, 1993. 39 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1988). This provision strikes a balance between the 
continued functioning of the Board of Governors and accountability to the executive and 
legislative branches, who select and confirm, respectively, a successor. A recess appointment, 
on the other hand, would have allowed Ashley to remain in office for almost two years -
until the end of the second session of the 103d Congress Gudging from recent years, no 
earlier than October 1994) - without ever being subject to the Senate's approval. See infra 
text accompanying notes 199-200. 
Bush's ability to avoid Senate confirmation of Ashley's appointment is especially prob-
lematic because the appointment occurred in January 1993-after Bush lost his bid for re-
election, a point that did not escape the notice of commentators at the time. See, e.g., 
Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Two Cents Plain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at A17. 
17. The power of the President to make appointments during recesses of the Senate is 
particularly important because the courts have rejected the idea that the President has an 
inherent power to make appointments arising out of his duty to see that the laws are faith-
fully executed. In United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211 (No. 15,747) (C.C.D. Va. 1823), 
Justice Marshall, in his capacity as a circuit judge, held that the President could not make an 
appointment without Senate confirmation unless Congress had specifically authorized the 
President to do so or unless the President acted pursuant to the Recess Appointments 
Clause. 26 F. Cas. at 1213. In Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973), the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia also rejected the idea that the President has a 
power to make appointments independent of the Recess Appointments Clause or congres-
sional authorization. 360 F. Supp. at 1368-69. For further discussion of Williams, see infra 
note 221. 
18. See infra section 11.B. 
19. Intersession recesses include both recesses between two sessions of the same Con-
gress and recesses between the second session of one Congress and the first session of the 
subsequent Congress. See infra note 21. 
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three-month recesses of the late twentieth century.20 On the other 
hand, presidents have only recently made appointments during in-
trasession recesses, which are recesses occurring within a session of 
the Senate.21 Intrasession recesses - occurring most frequently in 
the past twenty-five years22 - typically last one to four weeks.23 
Recent presidents have more willingly made recess appointments 
during increasingly shorter intrasession recesses,24 culminating in 
Bush's appointment of Ashley25 during a twelve-day recess.26 
20. See U.S. Govr. PRINTING OFFICE, 1993-1994 OFFICIAL DIRECTORY, 1030 CoNGRESS 
580-90 (1993) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY]. 
21. It is possible for either the House or the Senate alone to take an intrasession recess, 
although the Constitution limits such a recess to three days unless the other chamber con-
sents. U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 4. 
Distinctions also exist among breaks between sessions. Some authorities use the term 
final adjournment to refer to intersession recesses that occur at the end of the two-year term 
of each Congress. See, e.g., Barnes v. Carmen, 582 F. Supp. 163, 166 (D.D.C.), revd. sub nom. 
Barnes v. Kline, 743 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The term intersession adjournment then refers 
to an adjournment occurring between the sessions of a particular Congress. 582 F. Supp. at 
164-65. For the purposes of this Note, however, the term intersession recess shall refer to 
both types of adjournments. Cf. infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text (describing rela-
tionship between adjournment and recess in Constitution). 
In addition, Congress sometimes speaks of adjourning to a day certain. See, e.g., LANA R. 
SLACK, SENATE CoMM. ON RULES & AoMIN., SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING 
RULES, ORDERS, LAWS AND REsOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 22.1 (1992); CONGRESSIONAL QuAR-
TERLY's GUIDE TO CoNGRESs 416 (Mary Cohn et al. eds., 4th ed. 1991). As its wording 
suggests, this term generally excludes intersession recesses, because when Congress adjourns 
to a "day certain," it specifies its date of return and thus does not conclude its current session. 
Barnes, 582 F. Supp. at 166 n.7. 
The distinction between types of adjournmen~ nevertheless sometimes blurs. During the 
period before the Gulf War, the lOlst Congress took a final adjournment under the proviso 
that it should be reassembled if the Senate and House leadership believed "the public inter-
est •.. warrant[ed] it." H. Con. Res. 399, lOlst Cong. 2d Sess. § 2 (1990), 136 CoNG. REc. 
H12,370 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). Similarly, in the Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929), the 
Supreme Court held that the 69th Congress took a final adjournment on July 3, 1926, despite 
the fact that on that day, the Senate adjourned to a day certain - November 10, 1926, when 
it sat as a court of impeachment. 279 U.S. at 672 n.1. 
22. See CoNGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 20, at 586-89. 
23. Id. 
24. See Memorandum of United States Senate as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion, and in Opposition to Defendants' Motions, for Summary Judgment on Count 1\vo, 
Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1993) (Civ. A. No. 93-0032-LFO), reprinted in 
139 CoNG. REc. S8545 app. (daily ed. July l, 1993) [hereinafter Senate Brief] (brief by Senate' 
Legal Counsel printed in the Congressional Record, with appendix listing recent intrasession 
recess appointments). Because the resolution to file the brief in the Mackie case did not 
receive bipartisan support, as is traditional for Senate participation in litigation, the brief was 
not filed. See 139 CoNG. REc. S8544 (daily ed. July 1, 1993). 
25. Bush also named, among others, eight members to the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission during this recess. Bush White House Annoucements, supra note 
7; McAllister, supra note 7, at A13. 
26. Presidents have also utilized the clause to grant repeated recess appointments to the 
same person, a practice that has the potential to evade permanently the Senate's confirma-
tion. One nineteenth-century court voiced its concern about this practice: 
[The President's] appointments during recesses of the senate might be so made and re-
newed that they could not properly be called temporary .... [He] might, in disregard or 
defiance of the senate, continue [the recess appointee] in office indefinitely .... There is 
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These intrasession recess appointments reveal a disturbing 
trend. There is a less urgent need to fill vacancies that exist during 
brief recesses because the President can rely on the standard ap-
pointment process,27 which occurs when the Senate promptly 
reconvenes. Moreover, during some recesses, Senate committees 
meet to consider presidential nominations.28 Finally, even if a va-
cancy existed on the Postal Board of Governors, Bush could have 
utilized the usual method of appointment rather than attempting to 
avoid the Senate's advice and consent with a recess appointment.29 
This Note argues that courts should interpret the Constitution to 
nothing in the political experience of our country to warrant her security against such 
temporary appointments being thus made again and again with such results. 
In re District Attorney of United States, 7 F. Cas. 731, 735 (E.D. Pa. 1868) (No. 3,924). 
Presidents have indeed made such repeated recess appointments. For example, President 
Bush offered repeated appointments to four directors of the Federal Housing Finance Board, 
and his legal advisers did not indicate any problems with such practices. See 15 OP. OFF. 
LEGAL COUNSEL 98 (1991) (" '[T]here is no bar to granting ••• a second recess appointment 
[to a position] even though [the person receiving such appointment] is already serving as a 
recess appointee in that position. It is well-established that the President may make succes-
sive recess appointments to the same person.'") (quoting Memorandum from William P. 
Barr, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to 
the President, at 2 (Nov. 28, 1989)); see also 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 525 (1832) (arguing that the 
President can offer repeated recess appointments to a land office official who was rejected by 
the Senate for a permanent appointment). 
27. The President initiates the typical appointment process by submitting a nomination to 
the Senate. The Senate then refers the nomination to the appropriate committee, which may 
refer it to a relevant subcommittee. The subcommittee can then hold hearings, after which it 
votes on whether to recommend the nominee to the full committee. Next, the committee 
may hold hearings, at which time it decides whether to recommend the nominee to the full 
Senate. The Senate then considers the nomination, often i;ummarily following the recom-
mendation of the committee. Once the Senate confirms the nominee, the President signs the 
appointment. ROBERT F. DOVE & WILLIAM F. HILDENBRAND, U.S. SENATE, ENACTMENT 
OF A LAW: PROCEDURAL STEPS IN TifE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, S. Doc. No. 20, 97th Cong., 
2d Sess. 14 (1981); see also SLACK, supra note 21, § 31. 
28. For example, during the recess in which Bush appointed Ashley, Senate committees 
were meeting to consider President-elect Clinton's Cabinet nominations. See infra note 210. 
29. President Reagan also used the clause to avoid the requirement of Senate confirma-
tion. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. One egregious example of Reagan's 
abuse of the clause was his attempt to weaken the Legal Services Corporation, a program 
that provides legal aid to the poor. Seven of Reagan's eight budgets allocated no funds for 
legal services. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF TifE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1983, at 5-176, microformed on CIS No. 82-H180-l 
(Congressional Info. Serv.); see Looming Fight over Legal Services, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONI-
TOR, Jan. 11, 1991, at 20. Realizing that Congress would provide funds for the program, the 
President sought to weaken legal services by alternative means; through his recess appoint-
ment power, Reagan appointed directors to the board of the Corporation who were hostile to 
the program. See 130 CONG. REc. 23,236 (1984) (statement of Sen. Mitchell) ("[T]he admin-
istration has ..• attempted to dismantle the [Legal Services Corporation] by appointing indi-
viduals to operate it who are opposed to its existence."); Jo Ann Boyd, Despite Setbacks, 
Reagan's Assault on Legal Services Corporation Bears Fruit, 15 NATL. J. 562, 562-63 (1983) 
("Reagan ... has weakened the corporation's ability to deliver legal services to the poor. 
[He cut i]ts budget ••. [and] appointed ..• William J. Olson ... widely believed to have 
favored the corporation's abolition .•. chairman of the Legal Services board.''). President 
Bush continued this trend, and, together, Presidents Reagan and Bush issued 75 recess ap-
pointments to the Legal Services Corporation. Only 11 % of appointees to the Board re-
ceived Senate confirmation during the two Presidents' terms. See Maureen K. Gawler, 
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allow the President to make recess appointments only during inter-
session recesses of the Senate. Part I chronicles the history of presi-
dential recess appointments. This Part highlights the increasing 
frequency of, and questionable need for, intrasession recess ap-
pointments in the past twenty-five years. Part II examines the text 
of the Recess Appointments Clause and the intentions of the Fram-
ers regarding the scope of the clause and the appointment power in 
general. This Part argues that the text and the Framers' intentions 
indicate that the President's power to make recess appointments 
should be limited to intersession recesses. Part III focuses upon in-
terpretations of the clause by actors in the political sphere, namely 
the Senate and presidential legal advisors. Although these actors 
are arguably entitled to some deference by the judicial branch, this 
Part argues that executive and legislative opinions issued over the 
years fail to undermine the textual analysis limiting the President's 
recess appointment power to intersession recesses. Finally, Part IV 
contends that allowing the recess appointment power even during 
long intrasession recesses would not further the purposes of the 
clause. This Part reasons that Senate committees' consideration of 
nominations during recesses ensures the continuance of the advice-
and-consent process and that statutes provide an alternative means 
of filling vacancies in the executive branch. Such mechanisms high-
light the diminished need for a clause to fill vacancies during re-
cesses, and counsel against invoking the clause during intrasession 
recesses. This Note concludes that the purposes of the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause support the text in limiting the President's recess 
appointment power to intersession recesses. 
l. HISTORICAL PRACTICE OF RECESS APPOINTMENTS 
Intrasession recess appointments are a relatively new phenome-
non, occurring almost exclusively since 1947.30 This Part traces 
presidents' use of the clause and notes the types and lengths of the 
recesses in which presidents have invoked the power.31 Section I.A 
Letter to the Editor, "Recess Appointments" at Legal Services, WASH. PoST, July 30, 1993, at 
A20. 
30. Prior to 1947, presidents made a total of two intrasession recess appointments. See 
infra notes 38, 46 and accompanying text. Since 1947, presidents have made a total of 165 
intrasession recess appointments. See infra note 48. 
31. This Note attempts to consider all documented recess appointments, with the excep-
tion of military appointments, which the President often makes en bloc. Given the nature of 
recess appointments, however, it is not possible to compile a complete record. As the Con-
gressional Research Service recently observed: 
[I]t is virtually impossible to compile a complete list of recess appointments for the pe-
riod [prior to] 1965. Before July 1965, when the first issue of the Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents was published, recess appointments were recorded in a haphaz-
ard fashion. Although the Congressional Record is the best source from which to com-
pile a list of recess appointments before 1965, it is neither complete nor wholly reliable. 
Recess appointments do not appear in the Congressional Record at the time they are 
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shows that between the years 1789 and 1946, presidents used the 
power almost exclusively during intersession recesses, mostly of 
lengthy duration. Section I.B focuses upon recess appointments 
from 1947 to the present. This section demonstrates that recent 
presidents have invoked the clause with greater frequency during 
intrasession recesses, and during increasingly short recesses. 
A. Recess Appointments 1789-1946 
From the nation's founding until the mid-nineteenth century, 
Congress met for largely uninterrupted sessions separated by re-
cesses of six to nine months.32 During these intersession recesses, 
positions in the federal government would become available as for-
mer officers retired, died, or otherwise left office. Because the 
President could not utilize the standard means of appointment 
when Senators were dispersed throughout the country and were un-
able to provide their advice and consent, he needed an alternative 
means of appointment so that vacancies in federal offices would not 
result in governmental paralysis.33 By allowing presidents unilater-
ally to fill vacancies in federal offices, the Recess Appointments 
Clause offered such an alternative. During the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, presidents utilized the recess appoint-
ment power to fill offices such as judge, marshal, and collector.34 
made because they do not have to be confirmed by the ... Senate. It is only when the 
President wishes to change a recess appointment into a full term appointment that he 
must submit it to the Senate. Only then does the Congressional Record reflect the fact 
that a recess appointment was made. As a consequence, if the President does not nomi-
nate for a regular appointment someone who is serving a recess appointment, then that 
appointment is not found in the Congressional Record. 
Compiling such a list is further complicated by the fact that the Congressional Record 
on occasion is ambiguous about whether a recess appointment has been made. Some-
times, there is a notice accompanying a group of nominations stating that certain recess 
appointments were made during the last recess of the Senate. It is not always clear, 
however, whether all of the nominations in the group were given recess appointments. 
Memorandum from Rogelio Garcia, Government Division, Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress, to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Mar. 13, 
1985) [hereinafter Garcia Memorandum] (on file with author). 
32. See CoNGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 20, at 580-82. 
33. Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56, 58 (D.D.C. 1993) ("It is apparent that the purpose 
of the Recess Appointments Clause was to prevent disruptions in the functioning of the gov-
ernment occasioned by periods in which the Senate is unable to perform its role of advice 
and consent."); S. REP. No. 4389, 58th Cong., 3d Sess., reprinted in 39 CoNG. REc. 3823, 3824 
(1905) (stating that "grave inconvenience and harm to the public interest would ensue" with-
out such a clause); 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP· 
TION OF THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION 135 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1861) [hereinafter 
STATE CoNVENTION DEBATES] (stating that the clause would prevent "public inconve-
niences"); THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 454-56 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961) (arguing that the purpose of the clause was to "fill [appointments] without delay"), 
34. For example, in the recess between the First and Second Congresses, from March 3 to 
October 24, 1791, President George Washington appointed judges, marshals, surveyors, and 
collectors, among other federal officials. 1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERJCA 86 (Washington, D.C., Duff Green 1828) 
[hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE SENATE]. In the recess between the Sixth and Seventh Con-
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The practice of making recess appointments during the lengthy in-
tersession recesses continued throughout the nineteenth century.35 
While the Senate took one intersession recess each year in this 
period, it took only three intrasession recesses before 1857. In 
1800, 1817, and 1828, the Senate took a five-to-seven-day intrases-
sion recess at the end of December.36 Beginning in 1863, the Sen-
ate started taking annual intrasession recesses of approximately two 
weeks from the end of December through the beginning of Janu-
ary.37 Despite the increase in intrasession recesses, presidents con-
tinued to make recess appointments almost exclusively during the 
intersession recess. Indeed, the only documented intrasession re-
cess appointment in the nineteenth century occurred when Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson appointed Samuel Blatchford to a district 
court judgeship in 1867 .38 Except for a few lengthy intrasession re-
cesses during the 40th Congress,39 the pattern of long intersession 
and short intrasession recesses continued into the early twentieth 
century.40 
Although presidents in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies made almost no intrasession recess appointments, President 
Theodore Roosevelt stirred up controversy in the Senate and the 
media when he filled vacancies during what he called a "construc-
tive recess." This recess allegedly occurred during the "infinitesi-
gresses, lasting from March 4 until December 7, 1801, President Thomas Jefferson appointed 
Secretaries of the Treasury and Navy, a Postmaster General, various judges and marshals, 
and commercial agents and consuls at foreign ports. 1 id. at 400-04. There was some contro-
versy, however, when President James Madison recess-appointed envoys to Great Britain. 
Such positions were not established federal offices, but newly created positions to which the 
President previously lacked the power of appointment. CONGRESSIONAL QuARTERLY's 
GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 266. 
35. For example, President Andrew Jackson appointed registers, receivers, collectors, and 
surveyors during the recess between the 23d and 24th Congresses, lasting from March 4 to 
December 7, 1835. 4 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, supra note 34, at 485-88. President Franklin 
Pierce appointed envoys, judges, consuls, and a commissioner to China between the 32d and 
33d Congresses - during a recess lasting from March 4 to December 5, 1853. 9 id. at 167, 
169-70. 
36. The Senate took recesses from December 23 to December 30, 1800; from December 
24 to December 29, 1817; and from December 24 to December 29, 1828. CONGRESSIONAL 
DIRECTORY, supra note 20, at 580-81. 
37. See id. at 582. 
38. 15 JouRNAL OF THE SENATE, supra note 34, pt. 2, at 790. Johnson made the appoint-
ment during a 94-day recess in the 40th Congress, from March 30 to July 3, 1867. Although 
this appointment constitutes the only documented intrasession recess appointment in the 
nineteenth century, it is impossible to determine accurately the existence of other such ap-
pointments. See supra note 31. 
39. The only nineteenth-century intrasession recesses that did not occur around the 
Christmas holiday took place during the 40th Congress, from March 30 to July 3, 1867; from 
July 20 to November 21, 1867; from July 27 to September 21, 1868; from September 21 to 
October 16, 1868; and from October 16 to November 10, 1868. CONGRESSIONAL DIREC-
TORY, supra note 20, at 580-83. 
40. See id. at 583-84. 
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mal" period between two consecutive sessions of the Senate.41 The 
Senate ended a special session on December 7, 1903, and, with "one 
fall of the gavel," immediately commenced a regular session of the 
58th Congress.42 Roosevelt claimed that a split second separated 
the two sessions, thus creating a recess which allowed him to make 
recess appointments. The Senate Judiciary Committee responded 
to this action by preparing a report on what constituted a recess of 
the Senate.43 In its report, the Committee rejected the notion of a 
constructive recess and concluded that recesses occurred only when 
the Senate was not sitting either as a branch of Congress or in ex-
traordinary session to perform executive duties.44 Although the 
Committee's report did not bind future presidents, it highlighted 
the political backlash that could result from such appointments. 
During the early twentieth century, presidents continued to in-
voke the Recess Appointments Clause almost exclusively during in-
tersession recesses to appoint federal officials.45 Only one 
documented intrasession recess appointment occurred in this pe-
riod. In 1928, President Calvin Coolidge appointed John Esch as 
commissioner of the Interstate Commerce Commission during a 
thirteen-day recess at the beginning of the 70th Congress.46 Com-
missioner Esch and Judge Blatchford47 represent the only docu-
mented intrasession recess appointees of the nation's first 150 years. 
B. Recess Appointments 1947-Present 
Frequent presidential use of the recess appointment power dur-
ing intrasession recesses began in 1947.48 President Harry Truman 
41. See The Infinitesimal Recess, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1903, at 8 (editorial). 
42. Special Session Is Merged into Regular, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1903, at 1. 
43. S. REP. No. 4389, supra note 33. For a discussion of this report, see infra section · 
III.A.1 
44. Id. 
45. For example, President Theodore Roosevelt - now invoking the power during an 
actual recess - appointed consuls, lieutenants, collectors, and judges during the recess of 
May 30 to December 7, 1908, between the first and second sessions of the 60th Congress. 39 
JOURNAL OF 1HE SENATE, supra note 34, at 3-32. 
46. 66 id. pt. 1, at 210.' This appointment created controversy, primarily because the Sen-
ate rejected Esch during the standard appointment process, although he remained in power 
pursuant to his recess appointment. 66 id. pt. 1, at 586-87; 69 CoNo. Rec. 7043-44 (1928). 
Senate rejections of recess appointees do not affect the appointees' commissions, which last 
until the end of the next session of the Senate. In re Marshalship for the S. & Middle Dists. 
of Ala., 20 F. 379, 382 (M.D. Ala. 1884); 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 336, 339 (1830). 
47. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
48. RECENT PRESIDENTIAL RECESS APPOINTMENTS 
President 
Harry Truman (1945-1953) 
Dwight Eisenhower (1953-1961) 
John Kennedy (1961-1963) 
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made twenty appointments over four intrasession recesses.49 Presi-
dent Dwight Eisenhower made nine intrasession recess appoint-
ments, during recesses as short as thirty-five days,50 but neither 
President John Kennedy nor President Lyndon Johnson made any 
intrasession recess appointments. President Richard Nixon revived 
the practice of intrasession recess appointments, making eight such 
appointments.51 Although President Gerald Ford sparingly in-
voked the clause, and made no intrasession recess appointments,52 
President Jimmy Carter resumed the practice, making seventeen in-
trasession appointments.53 
President Carter may have been the first modem president to 
utilize the clause expressly to avoid the Senate's advice and con-
sent. Carter .recess-appointed a controversial nominee, John 
McGarry, to the Federal Election Commission after the Senate 
Richard Nixon (1969-1974) 33 8 
Gerald Ford (1974-1977) 8 0 
Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) 42 17 
Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) 170 73 
George Bush (1989-1993) 41 37 
Bill Clinton {1993- ) 0 1 
This chart is based primarily on a chart compiled for a Senate committee in its consideration 
of Martha Seger to be a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
See Garcia Memorandum, supra note 31; see also McAllister, supra note 7 {detailing recess 
appointments of recent presidents). For more recent recess appointments, see the Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents. Garcia's memorandum notes that the figures do not 
include appointments for judges, postmasters, U.S. attorneys, customs directors and collec-
tors, the Diplomatic and Foreign Service, and the U.S. Public Health Service. This chart 
contains all the recess appointments that have been documented since 1945. See supra note 
31. 
49. Truman filled vacancies in the offices of judges, U.S. attorneys, and marshals. 89 
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, supra note 34, pt. 3, at 3125-27. 
50. Eisenhower appointed an ambassador, a commissioner of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), and members of the Export-Import Bank during the recess that 
lasted from July 3 until August 8, 1960. 102 id. pt. 1, at 686. 
51. McAllister, supra note 7, at Al3. Nixon filled such positions as Assistant Attorney 
General, judge, and SEC commissioner. 113 JouRNAL OF THE SENATE, supra note 34, at 431 
(recess from Aug. 6 to Sept. 8, 1971); 112 icf., at 612-13 (recess from Oct. 14 to Nov. 16, 1970). 
52. Ford may not have made any appointments during intrasession recesses because of 
the holding in Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 {D.C. Cir. 1974), that intrasession recesses 
do not prevent the PresiC!ent from pocket-vetoing legislation. The Pocket Veto Clause con-
cerns a period of time - an adjournment - during which a house of Congress cannot accept 
a presidential veto. Possibly concerned by the analogy to the Recess Appointments Clause, 
which concerns a period of time - a recess - during which the Senate cannot confirm a 
nominee, Ford may have concluded from Kennedy v. Sampson that he could not make recess 
appointments during intrasession recesses. See 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 311, 313 {1979) 
("[S]ince Kennedy v. Sampson ••• Presidents have been reluctant to make recess appoint-
ments during an intrasession adjournment of the Senate ..•. "). 
53. Carter recess-appointed officers to positions such as Member of the National Labor 
Relations Board, Undersecretary of Agriculture, and Assistant Director of the Community 
Services Administration. 122 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, supra note 34, at 645-46 (recess 
from Oct. 1 to Nov. 12, 1980). 
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twice failed to act on McGarry's nomination.s4 In addition, Carter 
made seventeen intrasession recess appointments as he was about 
to leave office.ss 
President Ronald Reagan greatly accelerated the practice of in-
trasession recess appointments, making more - and more contro-
versial - intrasession appointments than any president in history. 
Reagan made seventy-three intrasession recess appointments, dur-
ing recesses as short as thirteen days.s6 Reagan often utilized the 
clause to evade the Senate's advice and consent. For example, he 
recess-appointed Martha Seger, a controversial nominee, to the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System just three days 
after the Senate Banking and Urban Affairs Committee narrowly 
approved her nomination, ten to eight on straight party lines.s7 
Reagan also avoided controversy over nuclear power issues by 
making a recess appointment to the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion during a twenty-three day intrasession recess.ss Reagan 
evaded the Senate's confirmation procedures once again with his 
seven recess appointments to the National Council on the Humani-
ties. Some believed these recess appointees "appear[ed] inferior" 
54. See Kenneth Bredemeier, President's Authority to Make FEC Recess Appointment 
Upheld, WASH. PoST, Jan. 9, 1979, at A3. The Senate did not act on the nomination because 
of questions about McGarry's financial affairs and the nominee's close ties to House Speaker 
Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, Jr. See Sara Fitzgerald, The Price of Being Tip O'Neill's Friend, 10 
NATL. J. 1786 (1978). 
55. Carter filled positions for federal district court judge, Assistant Secretary of the Inte-
rior, Governor of the U.S. Postal Service, and on the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation and 
the National Labor Relations Board, among others. Nominations to Government Positions, 
3 PuB. PAPERS 2870-71 (Jan. 8, 1981); Myron Struck, Reagan's Recess Hirings Elicit Resent-
ment, WASH. PoST, July 11, 1984, at A17. 
56. See supra note 48. Then-Senate Minority Leader Byrd decried Reagan's use of the 
clause: "There was no evidence that the needs of Government required [recess appoint-
ments] to be made [during short intrasession recesses of the Senate]." 130 CoNo. REC. 
23,234 (1984). 
57. Digest of Other White House Announcements, 2 PuB. PAPERS app. a, at 1915 (July 2, 
1987). The Committee's four days of hearings on the nomination raised " 'serious questions' 
about Seger's views and qualifications" that the full Senate was unable to address as a result 
of the recess appointment. See Struck, supra note 55, at A17. As the members of the Bank-
ing Committee who voted against the nomination lamented: 
At the time of her nomination to the Federal Reserve Board, Dr. Martha Romayne 
Seger was largely unknown to this Committee, to the Senate, to the economics profes-
sion, to the financial community outside the State of Michigan, and to the public at large. 
This was true with respect to her views, her qualifications and her experience. 
It is especially pertinent in Dr. Seger's case that there exists no written record of her 
views on economic and monetary matters. The nominee was unable to provide the 
Committee with a single piece of writing, whether scholarly or popular in nature, on any 
financial, economic or monetary topic. 
130 CoNo. REc. 22,779 (1984). In addition, Seger did not have the agriculture or small busi-
ness background the Senate sought in the next nominee to the Federal Reserve Board. 130 
id. 
58. See Bypassing a Debate over Nuclear Power, INDUSTRY WK., Aug. 6, 1984, at 69. The 
Secretary of Energy, Donald Hodel, applauded the recess appointment of Lando Zech to the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for circumventing "the lengthy confirmation process." 
Thomas Riehle & Deborah Galembo, When the Senate's Away, 16 NATL. J. 1376 (1984). 
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to appointments that prior presidents made,59 and the Senate Labor 
and Human Resources Committee was intending to question the 
nominees on their politics and credentials before Reagan made the 
recess appointments.60 Reagan made numerous intrasession recess 
appointments just before leaving office, including "controversial 
candidates whose nominations had been opposed at the State De-
partment and other agencies and blocked on the Hill."61 By waiting 
until the Senate was in recess to appoint controversial figures to 
federal posts, Reagan shaped executive agencies in ways that would 
have been difficult, if not impossible, if the President had allowed 
the Senate to play its normal constitutional role in the appoint-
ments process. 
Reagan's successor, President George Bush, did not utilize the 
clause quite as frequently or controversially as did his predecessor. 
Bush did nevertheless make thirty-seven intrasession recess ap-
pointments. 62 In addition to his appointment of Thomas Ludlow 
Ashley to the Postal Service Board of Governors during a twelve-
day recess,63 particularly noteworthy were President Bush's eleven 
recess appointments to the Board of the Legal Services Corpora-
tion. 64 In making these appointments, Bush continued the practice 
commenced by Reagan of filling the Board almost exclusively with 
recess appointees.65 Both the Ashley appointment and the Legal 
Services Corporation controversy suggest that Bush's legal advisers 
viewed the clause as an offensive weapon in tilting the balance of 
power between the President and the Senate - by evading Senate 
59. Mary Beth Norton, the Council's retiring deputy vice chairperson, noted that Rea-
gan's "appointments appear inferior to the ones made by Nixon, Ford and Carter. Although 
[the latter appointees] didn't have academic credentials either, their commitment to the hu-
manities was deep." Norman D. Atkins, President Names 7 to NEH Panel: Recess Appoint-
ment to Advisory Group Assailed, WASH. PoST, July 7, 1984, at Dl, D3. 
60. See id. at Dl ("[S]ome of [the recess appointees], already under fire over their politics 
and credentials, had been expected to face questioning by the Senate Labor and Human 
Resources Committee before being confirmed."). Another body to which Reagan made re-
cess appointments was the United States Commission on Civil Rights, a commission which 
had been a "constant irritant to [the President] .... " See Robert Pear, Reagan Reported 
Planning to Name 4 to Rights Pane~ N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1983, at Al. 
61. Dick Kirschten, Now That the Voters Can't Squawk This Lame Duck ls Making 
Waves, 20 NATL. J. 3084, 3085 (1988). 
62. McAllister, supra note 7. 
63. See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text. Besides the appointments to the Postal 
Board of Governors and Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission mentioned 
above, President Bush recess-appointed the Director of the Mint, the Chairman of the For-
eign Claims Settlement Commission, and Commissioners to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 
among others, during the Senate recess from January 7 to January 20, 1993. 134 JouRNAL OF 
THE SENATE, supra note 34, at 488-89. 
64. Digest of Other White House Announcements, 1 Pua. PAPERS, app. a, at 1216 (Jan. 
10, 1992); Digest of Other White House Annoucements, 2 Pua. PAPERS, app. a, at 1683 (Sept. 
5, 1991). 
65. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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confirmation procedures - rather than as a supplement to the gen-
eral appointment power66 - in filling vacancies when the Senate 
could not provide its confirmation.67 In contrast, President Bill 
Clinton has, as of the publication of this Note, sparingly invoked 
the clause. He has made only one intrasession recess appointment, 
naming John Truesdale to the National Labor Relations Board.68 
The recent practice of intrasession recess appointments demon-
strates how presidents have used, with increasing frequency, the re-
cess appointment power during intrasession recesses of decreasing 
length. As recent invocations of the clause illustrate, such a maneu-
ver may affect the balance of power between the executive and leg-
islative branches by allowing the President to evade an important 
check on his authority. This prospect encourages a detailed inquiry 
into the scope of the clause, to determine whether presidential use 
of the Recess Appointments Clause to make intrasession appoint-
ments is consistent with the text of the clause and with the Framers' 
intentions regarding the appointment power. 
II. TEXT AND FRAMERS' INTENTIONS 
Analysis of a constitutional clause begins with the language of 
the text.69 The debates at the Constitutional Convention, at state 
ratifying conventions, and, to a lesser extent, in contemporaneous 
publications such as The Federalist Papers, provide additional useful 
insight into the contemporary understanding of the language.7° The 
66. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. 
67. See, e.g., 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 299, 309 (1989} (preliminary print) (opinion of 
Asst. Atty. Gen. William Barr) ("[T]he recess appointment power is an important counter-
balance to the power of the Senate."). This Note, in contrast, argues that the Framers in-
tended the clause to allow recess appointments during intersession recesses - in which the 
Senate could not provide its advice and consent - and that they did not expect the clause to 
affect the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. See supra note 
33 and accompaning text; infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
68. Digest of Other White House Annoucments, 30 WEEKLY CoMP, PRES. Doc. 162 (Jan. 
25, 1994). Clinton made the appointment to provide the five-member labor board - which 
was operating with two members - with a third member, necessary for a quorum. See 
Jonathan Groner, NLRB Nominee Gould Stuck in Political Limbo, RECORDER, Dec. 1, 1993, 
at 3; Recess Appointment of Truesdale Brings NLRB to Voting Strength, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA} (Jan. 2, 1994), available in LEXIS, Labor Library, Dlabrt File. 
69. See Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993) (stating that "courts must, in the 
first instance, interpret the text" to determine if a controversy is nonjusticiable}; Solorio v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987) ("[T]he plain language of the Constitution .•• should 
be controlling on the subject of court-martial jurisdiction."). 
70. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397-98 (1989) (finding significant the 
failure of prohibitions against multiple officeholding by judges to reach the floor of the Con-
stitutional Convention); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (stating that the 
Framers' intent is important in determining the degree to which a search infringes upon indi-
vidual privacy); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) (stating that Convention records, 
contemporaneous writings, and debates clarify the Framers' intent); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 129 (1976) (stating that Convention debates, Federalist Papers, and evolution of a 
draft version of Constitution support textual analysis). 
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language of the Recess Appointments Clause gives the President 
the power to fill vacancies during "the Recess of .the Senate."71 
This Part explores the two possibilities for the meaning of the Re-
cess - intersession recesses and all recesses.72 Section II.A ana-
lyzes the language of the Constitution and concludes that the 
Recess Appointments Clause refers only to intersession recesses. In 
reaching this conclusion, this section first explores the Framers' 
choice of the term the Recess rather than other potential terms. 
Section II.A also engages in a structural reading of the clause, con-
cluding that an interpretation of the .Recess that includes intrases-
sion recesses leads to illogical results by creating commissions that 
last an additional session beyond those granted to officers receiving 
recess appointments during intersession recesses. Section Il.B ex-
amines other sources - most notably, the debates at the Constitu-
tional Convention - to determine the Framers' intentions 
regarding the scope of the appointment power. Although these 
sources shed little direct light on the Framers' intentions, they sug-
gest that limiting the Recess Appointments Clause to intersession 
recesses accords most consistently with the Framers' intentions re-
garding the system of checks and balances~ particularly as applied 
to the appointment power. 
A. Constitutional Text 
The Recess Appointments Clause provides: 
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may 
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions 
which shall expire at the End of their next Session.73 
The Framers' use of the phrases the Recess and the End of their 
next Session provides the primary basis for concluding that the 
Recess Appointments Clause refers only to intersession recesses.74 
71. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
72. Only two types of recesses are possible: recesses occurring between sessions (inter-
session recesses) and recesses occurring within a session (intrasession recesses). The phrase 
the Recess can thus refer to one of four possibilities: (i) intersession recesses; (ii) intrasession 
recesses; (iii) both types of recesses; or (iv) neither type of recess. The fourth possibility is 
easily eliminated as a meaning for the phrase; if neither type of recess invoked the clause, 
then the clause, in effect, would be read out of the Constitution. The second option can also 
be eliminated. The Framers anticipated lengthy intersession recesses and short intrasession 
recesses. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. In light of the purpose of the clause 
- to prevent governmental paralysis, see supra note 33 - the Framers would not have in-
tended the power to apply to the short, but not to the lengthy, recesses. See infra note 107 
(noting the creation of a committee with appointment power only during an intersession 
recess of the Continental Congress). The first and third options are thus the only possibilities 
for the meaning of the Recess. 
73. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
74. The Supreme Court emphasized the significance of every word in the Constitution in 
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571 (1840) (plurality opinion) ("[N)o word was 
unnecessarily used or needlessly added .... Every word appears to have been weighed with 
the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to have been fully understood."). See also 
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1. The Recess 
The Framers anticipated that the Senate would take two types 
of recesses, intersession and intrasession recesses. Even though, as 
it turned out, intrasession recesses occurred very rarely in the early 
days of the Republic,75 the Framers understood that such recesses 
could occur, as evidenced by their own recesses within a session of 
the Constitutional Convention.76 Article I, Section S, Clause 477 
provides textual evidence for their awareness of intrasession re-
cesses as it addresses the situation in which one House of Congress 
adjourns "during the Session of Congress."78 Under this clause, the 
Senate could take many recesses, and each recess would be, by defi-
nition, an intrasession recess, which is the only type of recess that 
can occur within a session of Congress.79 
In light of this awareness of the types of recesses, the Framers' 
understanding of ho'Y the Senate's schedule would operate illus-
trates the importance of their choice of the singular term the Recess. 
The Framers provided for the Congress to convene every year.80 
Because of the slow transportation of the era and the Framers' as-
sumption that the Senate would have limited duties,81 they antici-
pated that the Senate, each year, would have one largely 
uninterrupted session, followed by one intersession recess.82 Even 
though they anticipated one intersession recess and possibly several 
intrasession recesses per year, the Framers authored a clause pro-
viding for appointments during the Recess, instead of during the Re-
cesses. The Framers' use of the singular term suggests that they 
United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 732 (1931) (stating that the Constitution was drafted 
with "meticulous care and by men who so well understood how to make language fit their 
thought"). 
75. The Senate took only three intrasession recesses in its first 65 years, and none in its 
first 10 years. See supra note 36. 
76. See 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 18 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION REcoRDs] ("Genl. Pinkney wished to know of Mr. 
R[andolph] whether he meant an adjournment sine die, or only an adjournment for the 
day .... Mr. Randolph, had never entertained an idea of an adjournment sine die •.•• He had 
in view merely an adjournment till tomorrow ..•. "). The motion to adjourn sine die is, in 
effect, a motion to dissolve the assembly. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 416; HENRY M. ROBERT, PARLIAMENTARY LAW 121 (1923). 
77. The clause provides: "Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without 
the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that 
in which the two Houses shall be sitting." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. 
78. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (emphasis added). See 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 599, 603 (1901) 
("(Article I, Section 5, Clause 4) contemplates the continuance of the session notwithstanding 
the adjournment."). 
79. See infra note 99. 
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year 
.... "). 
81. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
82. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. 
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intended the Recess Appointments Clause to refer only to the type 
of recess of which there would be one each year:83 the intersession 
recess. 
The Framers' choice of the singular term the Recess appears 
even more significant when compared to the plural phrase all Va-
cancies in the Recess Appointments Clause.84 The use of the plural 
term Vacancies in the Recess Appointments Clause suggests that 
the Framers deliberately chose the singular form of the term Recess. 
If the Framers intendei::l the clause to apply to both types of re-
cesses, they could have written it so that the President could fill all 
Vacancies during the Recesses or all Recesses. 85 
Moreover, the Framers' choice of the definite article the rather 
than the indefinite article a to precede Recess supports the conclu-
sion that Recess refers only to the intersession recess. The definite 
article the emphasizes the singular form of Recess. The use of an 
indefinite article, on the other hand, would not limit as explicitly 
the meaning of Recess to the intersession recess. In light of the 
Framers' understanding that each session might include numerous 
intrasession recesses but would be followed by only one interses-
sion recess, the intersession Recess makes sense whereas the intrases-
sion Recess does not. 
The Framers' utilization of the term Recess elsewhere in the 
Constitution provides further support for limiting the meaning of 
the Recess to the. intersession recess. Article I, Section 3, Clause 2,86 
83. In rare circumstances, the Senate takes more than one intersession recess each year, 
when it sits for not only two regular sessions, but also special - or extraordinary - sessions. 
Examples of this phenomenon occurred in the First Congress, which had three sessions, the 
first lasting from March 4 to September 29, 1789, the second from January 4 to August 12, 
1790, and the third from December 6, 1790 to March 3, 1791; and the Fifth Congress, which 
also had three sessions, the first from May 15 to July 10, 1797, the second from November 13, 
1797 to July 16, 1798, and the third from December 3, 1798 to March 3, 1799. See CONGRES-
SIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 20, at 580. These extraordinary sessions, however, are not 
the usual course of business, and do not negate the traditional pattern of two-session Con-
gresses. See, e.g., 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 599, 603 (1901) (opinion of Atty. Gen. Philander Knox) 
("There have always been two sittings, sessions or assemblings of each Congress."). Accord-
ing to the Congressional Quarterly, 
For more than 140 years ... Congress stuck closely to the basic pattern of two ses-
sions: the first, a long one of six months or so that began in December of odd-numbered 
years - more than one year after the election; the second, a short one that met from 
December to March - a session that did not begin until after the next election had 
already taken place. 
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 21, at 54. 
84. The phrase "all Vacancies" describes the positions the President may fill through the 
recess appointment power. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
85. See Senate Brief, supra note 24, at S8546 ("The logical inference from [the Framers'] 
conspicuous avoidance of the word "all" is that [they] did not intend the recess appointment 
power to apply [to intrasession recesses]."). 
86. The clause provides: 
Immediately after [the Senators] shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Elec-
tion, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the 
Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the 
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which provided originally for state legislatures' selection of Sena-
tors, established that a governor could make temporary appoint-
ments to the Senate when vacancies occurred "during the Recess of 
the [State] Legislature. "87 The Framers included this clause to en-
sure the smooth running of the Senate when state legislatures, 
which often met only once a year, were unable to fill vacancies.BB 
As with the Recess Appointments Clause, the Framers thus appar-
ently chose to preface the term Recess with the definite article the 
to refer to the one expected recess between sessions. The potential 
of long recesses to interfere with these purposes suggests why the 
Framers chose to limit the meaning of Recess to the intersession 
recess. 
The Framers could have granted the President the power to 
make recess appointments during all recesses not only by using the 
plural recesses or the indefinite phrase a recess, but also by utilizing 
another term that could apply to both intrasession and intersession 
recesses, such as adjournment. In the Constitution, the meaning of 
the term adjournment usually encompasses both intersession and 
intrasession recesses.B9 Although two of the occurrences of the 
term adjournment do not indicate what type of recess the Framers 
second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expira· 
tion of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; [and if Vacan· 
cies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any 
State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting 
of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.] 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added) (bracketed material superseded by the Seven-
teenth Amendment, ratified by three-fourths of the states on Apr. 8, 1913, which provides for 
the direct election of Senators). 
87. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 3, cl. 2. (emphasis added). 
88. Just as the Framers intended the Recess Appointments Clause to fill vacancies in 
federal offices that happen during the lengthy intersession recesses, see supra note 33, Article 
I, Section 3, Clause 2 aimed to fill vacancies in the Senate during recesses of the state legisla-
tures. See 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION REcoRDs, supra note 76, at 231 ("Mr. Randolph thought 
[the clause] necessary <in order> to prevent inconvenient chasms in the Senate. In some 
states the Legislatures meet but once a year. As the Senate will have more power & consist 
of a smaller number than the other House, vacancies there will be of more consequence.") 
(second alteration in original). 
89. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 5, cl. 1; 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3; U.S. 
CoNST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1). 
The Senate's parliamentary rules - although they do not affect constitutional analysis 
because they only define parliamentary procedures - distinguish between the terms recess 
and adjournment. For example, a Senate that reconvenes after an adjournment starts a new 
legislative day, whereas a Senate returning after a recess does not. "A legislative day is the 
period of time following an adjournment of the Senate until another adjournment. A recess 
(rather than an adjournment) in no way affects a legislative day ..•. " DovE & HILDEN-
BRAND, supra note 27, at 9. This distinction may have less practical significance today be· 
cause the need to create new legislative days through adjurnment has vastly diminished. 
Under current practices, the Senate proceeds to consider bills under unanimous consent 
agreements - which do not require the creation of a legislative day - rather than motions 
to proceed - which require the creation of such a day. Telephone Conversation with U.S. 
Senate Parliamentarian's Office (July 19, 1994). 
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contemplated,90 two other instances provide more assistance. The 
use of adjournment most similar to the use of the Recess in the Re-
cess Appointments Clause - in its recognition of the dangers of an 
absent Senate - appears in Article I, Section 7, Clause 2,91 the 
Pocket Veto Clause. The Pocket Veto Clause provides that a bill 
passed by Congress and held by the President for ten days will be-
come law "unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its 
Retum."92 The clause expressly refers to the inability of the Senate 
- because of its recess - to receive the President's message indi-
cating his veto of the bill. Such an inability to receive a veto might 
occur during either an intrasession or an intersession recess.93 The 
Pocket Veto Clause's use of Adjournment thereby reveals how the 
term can be used to encompass both intrasession and intersession 
recesses. 
The Framers used adjourn specifically to refer to intrasession 
90. Neither Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 nor Article II, Section 3, Clause 1 provides any 
information regarding the scope of adjournment. The former clause provides that: 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House 
of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be 
presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, 
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds 
of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations 
prescribed in the Case of a Bill. 
U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 7, cl. 3 (emphasis added}. The latter clause states: 
[The President] shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of 
the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge nec-
essary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or 
either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of . 
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall re-
ceive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States. 
U.S. CoNST. art. II,§ 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added}. 
91. The clause states: 
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he 
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in 
which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, 
and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House 
shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other 
House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that 
House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be 
determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the 
Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be 
returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted} after it shall have been 
presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless 
the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a 
Law. 
U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added}. 
92. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
93. Unlike today's Senate, the Senate of the late eighteenth century was not able to re-
ceive messages from the President during recesses. Recent practice authorizing an agent to 
receive the President's veto messages during a recess facilitates return of a bill. See Barnes v. 
Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 
361 (1987); see also infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text. 
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recesses94 in Article I, Section 5, Clause 4.95 This clause limits the 
maximum length of an adjournment of one House that adjourns 
"during the Session of Congress" without the other's consent to 
"[no] more than three days."96 Because only intrasession recesses 
can occur "during the Session of Congress,"97 this adjournment can 
only refer to intrasession recesses. 
The different meanings of Recess and Adjournment thus support 
the conclusion that the Framers, by using the former term in the 
Recess Appointments Clause, meant to refer only to the interses-
sion recess. Had the Framers intended for the appointment power 
to include intrasession recesses, they could have extended the 
power to adjournments, a term they clearly understood to include 
intrasession recesses. 
2. Next Session 
An examination of the Recess Appointments Clause as a 
whole98 - in particular, the phrase End of their next Session, which 
describes when a recess appointee's commission expires - reveals 
the illogic of interpreting the Recess to include intrasession recesses. 
The Framers envisioned the Senate schedule to include two 
types of recesses - intersession and intrasession recesses - but 
only one type of session - the Senate's annual meeting.99 The 
94. The other two uses of the verb adjourn in the Constitution do not assist in determin-
ing the type of recess invoked. First, Article II, Section 3, Clause 1, refers to the President's 
ability to adjourn the Congress. See supra note 90. Such an adjournment may result in either 
an intrasession or an intersession recess. Second, Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 refers to an 
adjournment from day to day by a minority of the Congress. The clause provides: 
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its 
own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a 
smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the 
Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each 
House may provide. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (emphasis added). Such an adjournment does not provide gui-
dance on the type of recess contemplated because under such a maneuver, the Senate is not 
in recess. Only a minority of the Senate adjourns, and thus, the Senate continues to meet as a 
whole. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 834 {Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) ("[A] smaller number is authorized to adjourn 
from day to day, thus to prevent a legal dissolution of the body .••• ") (emphasis added). 
95. See supra note 77. 
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. 
97. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
98. The Supreme Court has utilized an analogous technique called noscitur a sociis in the 
realm of statutory interpretation. Employing this principle, one looks to words associated 
with the term in question to clarify the term's meaning. See, e.g., Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) (in determining taxable income, the term discovery refers to oil 
and gas and mining industries because of the meanings of adjacent terms exploration and 
prospecting); Texas & N.O.R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 568 
(1930) (under Railway Labor Act of 1926, the designation of arbitration representatives with-
out influence - in consideration of the surrounding terms interference and coercion - refers 
to pressure or the use of power to induce action). 
99. One could plausibly interpret the terms recess and session as being mutually exclu-
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Framers anticipated that each year there would be one session fol-
lowed by one recess.10° Envisioning this schedule in determining 
how long recess appointees would remain in office, the Framers rec-
ognized that the session was the only period in which the President 
could nominate, and the Senate confirm, a permanent appointee. 
The Recess Appointments Clause grants recess appointees commis-
sions until the End of their next Session, giving the President one 
session in which to submit a nomination to the legislature for a per-
manent appointment. Officials appointed during the recess be-
tween sessions therefore have commissions that last through the 
end of the session immediately following that recess. If Recess were 
to include breaks during a session, however, officials appointed dur-
ing these breaks would have commissions lasting through the cur-
rent session and up to, as the clause provides, the end of the next 
session of the Senate.101 Officers receiving recess appointments 
during intrasession recesses would thus receive commissions lasting 
sive, so that recess refers to all periods in which the Senate is absent from the Senate cham-
bers, and session denotes all periods when the Senate is present. Applying these 
interpretations to the Recess Appointments Clause would allow the President to make recess 
appointments during intrasession recesses - because the Senate is not physically present at 
such times - and would dictate that the period between every recess constituted a session. 
In other words, the Senate would have many "minisessions," with new sessions commencing 
after each recess. Under this scenario, a recess appointment would last until the end of the 
next minisession, or until the next time the Senate took any type of recess. 
Such a definition of session is plainly inconsistent with the Framers' notions of session as 
the annual period in which the Senate met. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. In 
addition, interpreting session to mean simply any period in which the Senate is present would 
be inconsistent with the Constitution's reference to adjournments "during the Session of 
Congress." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4; see 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 599, 604 (1901) (arguing that 
the position that the Senate's reassembling after each intrasession recess constitutes a new 
session would be "a position wholly untenable in view of the constitutional provision as to 
adjournments during the session"). Even if the Framers did not have such an understanding 
about the meaning of session, and even if session did not refer to the annual periods of 
Senate activity, such an interpretation would have absurd consequences, with recess appoin-
tees' commissions lasting only a couple of weeks. For example, such minisessions of the 
Senate in the first session of the lOlst Congress ran from January 26 to February 8, 1989; 
February 22 to March 16, 1989; April 5 to April 18, 1989; May 2 to May 17, 1989; June 1 to 
June 22, 1989; July 12 to August 3, 1989; and September 7, 1989 to November 22, 1990. See 
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 20, at 589. 
Despite this inconsistency, this definition of session has been adopted by the executive 
branch in its interpretation of 5 U.S.C. § 5503(a) (1988), see infra note 177, a statute that 
prohibits salaries for officers who receive recess appointments to positions that become va-
cant while the Senate is in session. One of three exceptions to this rule provides that the 
salary prohibition does not apply "if, at the end of the session, a nomination for the office, 
other than the nomination of [the recess appointee], was pending before the Senate for its 
advice and consent." 5 U.S.C. § 5503(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added). The Office of Legal 
Counsel has argued that this "end of the session" refers to "the end of any period during 
which Congress is conducting business, not solely to the final adjournment of a formal session 
of Congress." 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 325, 329 n.3 (1989) (preliminary print). Despite 
this interpretation of§ 5503(a), however, one cannot persuasively argue for an interpretation 
of the terms recess and session that contradicts the Framers' notions of session and that re-
sults in unjustifiably short commissions. 
100. See infra notes 112-16. 
101. See 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 599, 604 (1901) (arguing that a commission for an officer 
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up to one session longer than the commissions of those receiving 
appointments during intersession recesses.102 Consequently, recess 
appointees confirmed during brief intrasession recesses could con-
ceivably stay in office twice as long as those receiving recess ap-
pointments during intersession recesses.1°3 Commissions with such 
divergent lengths occur only if the Recess includes intrasession re-
cesses, suggesting that the Framers intended the meaning of the Re-
cess to be limited to the intersession recess. 
B. Framers' Intentions Regarding the Appointment Power 
The Framers adopted the Recess Appointments Clause without 
debate.104 Convention debates on the general appointment power, 
however, shed light on the intended scope of the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause. 
The Recess Appointments Clause supplements105 the Presi-
dent's general appointment power.106 The Framers enacted the 
clause apparently to enable the President to fill vacancies that oc-
curred during the long intersession recesses when the Senate, with 
receiving an appointment during an intrasession recess would last until "the end of the next 
session, not the [end of the] session within which the recess occurs"). 
102. For a modem illustration of such a result, see infra text accompanying notes 200-01. 
103. See infra text accompanying notes 198-99. Moreover, the lengths of intrasession re-
cess appointees' commissions vary widely as opposed to those appointed during intersession 
recesses. See infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text. 
104. Richard Spaight, of North Carolina, proposed the clause, which the Framers adopted 
without discussion. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 76, at 540. See United 
States v. Woodley, 751F.2d1008, 1017 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting) ("The contemporane-
ous writings of the Framers are virtually barren of any references to the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause. Although the record contains a few scattered references to the Clause, it was 
never explained, debated or discussed in any meaningful way."), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 
(1985). 
105. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 33, at 455 ("The relation in which [the Recess 
Appointments Clause] stands to the [Appointments Clause] ..• denotes it to be nothing 
more than a supplement to the [latter]; for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary method of 
appointment in cases, to which the general method was inadequate."); S. REP. No. 4389, 
supra note 33, at 3824 ("[The Recess Appointments Clause] is essentially a proviso to the 
provision relative to appointments by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."). Even 
though the court in Staebler v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 585, 597 (D.D.C. 1979), urged that 
"[t]here is nothing to suggest that the Recess Appointments Clause was designed as some 
sort of extraordinary and lesser method of appointment," the lack of debate on the clause 
suggests the minimal impact the Framers intended the clause to have on the thoroughly dis-
cussed power of appointment and elaborately devised system of checks and balances. See 
infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Staebler court's claim that the 
Recess Appointments Clause does not have "subordinate standing" in the constitutional 
scheme threatens to shift the balance of power on appointments dramatically toward the 
President. See infra text accompanying note 117. The Staebler court evidently had no qualms 
about allowing such a shift: "[W]here ... there is an ambiguity ... it is appropriate to 
consider that the President was intended by the framers of the Constitution to possess the 
active, initiating, and preferred role with respect to the appointment of officers of the United 
States." Staebler, 464 F. Supp. at 599 (footnote omitted). This Note, in contrast, accords 
greater significance to the lack of debate about the clause. 
106. See supra notes 9, 27. 
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its members dispersed throughout the country, could not readily re-
convene to provide its advice and consent.107 In light of the sub-
stantial discussion on the appointment power, the lack of debate on 
the Recess Appointments Clause suggests that the Framers in-
tended the clause to be auxiliary in nature and that they believed it 
would not affect the Constitution's meticulously developed system 
of checks and balances. This section argues that the limited pur-
poses of the clause support the conclusion that the Framers in-
tended the meaning of the Recess to be confined to the intersession 
recess. 
The Framers heatedly debated the general power of appoint-
ment.108 Delegates to the Convention voiced great distrust of the 
executive and expressed the need for checks and balances to 
counteract the power of the President.109 Having rejected attempts 
to vest the appointment power solely in the executive or the legisla-
ture, the Framers ultimately adopted a compromise that required 
the input of both branches.110 They intended the sharing of the ap-
pointment power to accomplish two goals: responsibility - from 
the President's power of nomination - and stability - from the 
Senate's power of confirmation.111 
107. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. The Recess Appointments Clause 
does not seem to be the first mechanism the Framers used to fill vacancies during lengthy 
recesses. The Continental Congress, in which many of the Framers participated, appointed a 
committee that exercised the power of appointment, among other powers, during the five-
month recess between sessions in 1784. 26 JouRNALS OF TIIE CONTINENTAL CoNGRESs, 
1774-1789, at 287-88, 295-96 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1928) [hereinafter JouRNALS], cited in Sen-
ate Brief, supra note 24, at S8549 n.16. In support of the limitation of this appointment 
power to recesses between sessions of the Continental Congress, the Senate Brief further 
noted that "there is no record of such a committee's being named to sit or make appoint-
ments during the Congress's intrasession adjournments of several days or weeks." Id. (citing 
24 JOURNALS, supra, at 410 (four-day adjournment in 1783); 25 id. at 807, 809 (21-day ad-
journment in 1783); 27 id. at 710 {17-day adjournment in 1784-1785)). 
108. See JosEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF TIIE SENATE 17-19 {1953). 
109. See infra note 111. 
110. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
111. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 76, 77 {Alexander Hamilton); 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION 
REcoRDs, supra note 76, at 539 (statement of Gouverneur Morris). The goal of responsibil-
ity would be achieved through the recognition of a party that would be accountable for nomi-
nations, while stability would be achieved through the legislature's check on the unilateral 
power of appointment. The compromise that the Framers reached emphasizes the mainte-
nance of a system of checks and balances at the expense of the filling of all offices. As an 
example, the Senate's refusal to act on a nomination during a session leaves the office vacant. 
The debate on which branch would appoint judges reveals the power the Framers in-
tended for the Senate. Although a few wished the Executive to enjoy the sole power of 
appointment, see, e.g., 1 id. at 119 (statement of James Wilson); 2 id. at 389 (statement of 
Gouverneur Morris), many desired that the Senate would unilaterally appoint judges. See, 
e.g., 1 id. at 231-33 (statement of James Madison); 2 id. at 41 (statements of Alexander Martin 
and Roger Sherman), 43 (statements of Gunning Bedford and Edmund Randolph), 81 (state-
ments of Oliver Ellsworth and Charles Pinckney). Although the debate ended in the com-
promise of presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, it demonstrates the Framers' 
belief in the strengths of including the Senate in the process. This branch of the legislature 
provides stability and information in the appointment process, and supplies a needed check 
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In adopting the Recess Appointments Clause, the Framers an-
ticipated a Senate that would spend substantial amounts of time in 
recess.112 Indeed, because the Framers envisioned a Congress that 
otherwise might not convene every year, they enacted a clause re-
quiring Congress to meet once each year.113 Many delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention thought that the Senate would rarely sit, 
because the legislature only had the powers of making treaties, try-
ing impeachments (both of which seldom occurred), appointing of-
ficers (which could be done in the legislature's absence), due to the 
Recess Appointments Clause, and passing legislation (of which the 
Framers expected little).114 The schedule of the early Congresses 
confirmed their expectation of short sessions followed by lengthy 
intersession recesses: the first ten Senate recesses averaged approx-
imately seven months in length.115 Anticipating this schedule, the 
Framers allowed presidents to fill vacancies unilaterally during re-
cesses rather than requiring the Senate to remain perpetually in 
session.116 
on the powers of the President. See, e.g., James Iredell, Marcus I, NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH 
J. (Feb. 20, 1788), reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE CoNSTITUTION 161, 167 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) [hereinaf-
ter DocUMENTARY HISTORY] (reprinting James lredell's response to George Mason's objec-
tions to the Constitution). 
112. The Framers "envisioned that Congress would convene its annual session, complete 
its business within several months, and adjourn for the remaining three-fourths of the year." 
Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (examining debates of the Constitutional 
Convention regarding whether Congress would sit during the winter or spring), vacated as 
moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). Moreover, the Framers failed to adopt 
the provision from the Articles of Confederation that ensured that "no period of adjourn-
ment be for a longer duration than the space of six months." Articles of Confederation, 1777 
art. IX, cl. 7. Such an omission suggests that the Framers anticipated that recesses might 
exceed six months. 
113. See supra note 80. 
114. James Wilson, Pennsylvania Convention Debates (Dec. 11, 1787), reprinted in 2 
DocuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 111, at 568. Other sources, including delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention, echo this view: 
Mr. King could not think there would be a necessity for a meeting every year .•.• The 
most numerous objects of legislation belong to the States. Those of the Natl. Legislature 
were but few. The chief of them were commerce and revenue. When these should be 
once settled, alterations would be rarely necessary and easily made. 
2 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 76, at 198; see also 4 STATE CONVENTION 
DEBATES, supra note 33, at 135 (statement of Archibald Maclaine) ("Congress are not to be 
sitting at all times; they will only sit from time to time, as the public business may render it 
necessary."); Roger Sherman, A Citizen of New Haven: Observations on the New Federal 
Constitution (Jan. 7, 1788), in 15 DocuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 111, at 280, 281 (essay 
written by Connecticut delegate to the Constitutional Convention, noting that "[i]t is not 
probable that Congress will have occasion to sit longer than two or three months in a year"). 
115. See CoNGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 20, at 580. 
116. See United States v. Allocco, 200 F. Supp. 868, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (quoting 3 
STORY, supra note 94, § 1551, at 410 (stating that a requirement that the Senate be perpetu-
ally in session "would have been at once burthensome to the senate, and expensive to the 
public. [The Recess Appointments Clause, on the other hand,] combines convenience, 
promptitude of action, and general security.")), affd., 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. de-
nied, 371 U.S. 964 (1963); see also 4 STATE CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 33, at 135 
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An expansive reading of the Recess Appointments Clause that 
allows Presidents to make recess appointments during intrasession 
recesses would contravene the Framers' intention to include the 
Senate in the appointment process.117 Although the Framers recog-
nized that vacancies would often need to be filled during long ab-
sences of the Senate, it seems unlikely that they would have enacted 
without debate a clause that could upset the balance of powers that 
they had carefully orchestrated regarding the appointment power. 
Allowing the President to utilize the Recess Appointments Clause 
during all recesses would have dramatically shifted the balance of 
power toward the President by providing a broad loophole in the 
requirement of advice and consent. When both the President and 
Senate are available to act on nominations, the recess appointment 
power does not affect the balance of power between the branches. 
Although the Framers granted the President powers of unilateral 
appointment during intersession recesses, they expected that the 
Senate could not possibly provide its advice and consent during 
such lengthy recesses. On the other hand, presidential utilization of 
recess appointments during the much shorter intrasession recesses 
would threaten to evade the standard appointment process, thereby 
shifting the balance of power toward the President. If the Framers 
had intended such a result, they would likely have discussed the 
clause. That the Framers intended to give the President such a 
loophole to escape the normal system of checks and balances in the 
appointment process seems unlikely in light of the minimal impact 
the Framers intended the clause to have on the system of checks 
and balances. 
III. LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
CLAUSE 
Although opinions from the Senate and the Attorney General 
are not binding on courts, such opinions may provide useful inter-
pretations of the Recess Appointments Clause, especially in an 
arena with few judicial decisions. Courts have looked to opinions 
of the Attorneys General in supplementing textual interpreta-
tion, 118 and have noted that Senate opinions are useful in identify-
(statement of Archibald Maclaine) (stating that the power to make appointments during re-
cesses "can be vested nowhere but in the executive, because he is perpetually acting for the 
public"). 
117. See S. REP. No. 4389, supra note 33, at 3824 ("[The Recess Appointments Clause] 
was carefully devised so as to accomplish the purpose in view, without in the slightest degree 
changing the policy of the Constitution, that such appointments are only to be made with the 
participation of the Senate."). 
118. Attorneys general have advised presidents on the scope of their recess appointment 
power for the past 170 years. In light of such opinions, and considering the lack of caselaw 
on the subject, courts have considered the .opinions of presidential legal advisers helpful in 
interpreting the clause. See United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 713 (2d Cir. 1962) (noting 
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ing legislative opposition - or the lack thereof - to executive 
assertions of authority.119 The Senate initially expressed its views 
on the Recess Appointments Clause in 1905 in a Judiciary Commit-
tee Report that defined a "recess of the Senate. "120 Section III.A 
argues that this report too narrowly focuses on disproving fictional 
recesses121 to serve effectively as a means of distinguishing between 
intrasession and intersession recesses.122 The section continues by 
examining several sense-of-the-Senate resolutions123 that have been 
offered in the past decade.124 These resolutions typically suggest 
that the President should make recess appointments only during in-
tersession recesses or intrasession recesses of a minimum length, 
but they fail to explain why appointments during intrasession re-
cesses of any length are constitutionally permissible. 
In the executive sphere, presidential legal advisers have advised 
presidents on the scope of their recess appointment power since the 
mid-nineteenth century. As presidents began to exercise the power 
over shorter intrasession recesses, these advisers acquiesced in sup-
porting such appointments. Section 111.B reviews the opinions of 
presidential legal advisers - specifically the Attorneys General, 
and more recently, the Office of Legal Counsel - and examines 
the justifications relied upon in supporting the presidential power 
to make intrasession recess appointments. This section concludes 
the willingness of presidents to follow interpretations by attorneys general of the meaning of 
the term happen in the Recess Appointments Clause), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 964 {1963); In re 
District Attorney of United States, 7 F. Cas. 731, 737 {E.D. Pa. 1868) (No. 3924) ("[T]he 
official opinions of attorney-generals may, for a long time, have been so uniformly acted 
upon by executive and legislative organs of the national government as to have become the 
unquestioned foundation of a system of legislation, or of administration."). 
119. Courts have deemed the Senate's failure to contest presidential action to be an ac-
ceptance of the action. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 
{1952) {Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pur-
sued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presi-
dents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of 
power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on 'executive 
Power' vested in the President by§ 1 of Art. II."); In re Farrow, 3 F. 112, 115 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 
1880) (stating that presidential practice of filling vacancies occurring during the recess "has 
been sanctioned ... by the unbroken acquiescence of the senate"); In re District Attorney, 7 
F. Cas. at 737 {"The effect ... attributable to [the executive usage of a power] may, in the 
absence of judicial contestation, be greater if legislative acquiescence has been evinced or 
may be implied."). 
120. S. REP. No. 4389, supra note 33. 
121. The "fictional" recess to which the report refers concerns a constructive recess that 
President Theodore Roosevelt claimed existed during the "infinitesimal" period between two 
sessions of the Senate, when the second session immediately followed the first without inter-
ruption. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
122. As opposed to "fictional" recesses, these two types of recesses are "nonfictional" in 
the sense that they describe periods in which the Senate as a whole is not present. 
123. For a definition of a sense·of-the-Senate resolution, see infra note 141. 
124. Although such resolutions lack binding effect in their own chamber, let alone the 
courts, they are significant in showing the Senate's nonacquiescence in the President's use of 
the clause. See supra note 119. 
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that their opinions - like the Senate opinions - provide insuffi-
cient constitutional support for interpreting the recess appointment 
power to include intrasession recesses. 
A. Senate Interpretations of the Recess Appointments Clause 
1. 1905 Senate Judiciary Committee Report 
The most important Senate pronouncement on recess appoint-
ments is the 1905 Report by the Senate Judiciary Committee.125 As 
discussed above,126 President Theodore Roosevelt attempted to 
construe the existence of a recess between the end of a special ses-
sion of the Senate and the immediate commencement thereafter of 
a regular session of the Senate.127 In response to this action, the 
Judiciary Committee submitted a report that defined a Senate 
recess.128 
The report found that recess was a term of "ordinary, not techni-
cal, signification,"129 and that it should be construed "as the ll)ass of 
mankind then understood it and now understand it."130 The report 
continued by defining a recess as "the period of time when the Sen-
ate is not sitting in regular or extraordinary session as a branch of 
the Congress, or in extraordinary session for the discharge of execu-
tive functions."131 The Committee thus distinguished between re-
cesses during which the Senate chambers stood empty with its 
members dispersed throughout the country, which fit the definition, 
and "recesses" that allegedly occurred in the split second between 
two consecutive sessions of the Senate, which did not fit the 
definition. 
In so defining recess, the Judiciary Committee did not distin-
guish between intersession and intrasession recesses. The Commit-
tee's report did not consider the intersession-intrasession 
distinction because, at the time of the report, there had been only 
' one documented intrasession recess appointment, made forty years 
earlier.132 Although intrasession recesses could arguably qualify as 
recesses under the report's definition of the term, the Senate in 
1905 was not faced with the prospect of presidents' utilizing the 
clause during intrasession recesses. Instead, the Committee report 
addressed one abuse: constructive recesses. The report specifically 
focuses on the concept of a constructive recess on several occasions: 
125. S. REP. No. 4389, supra note 33. 
126. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
127. Special Session Is Merged into Regular, supra note 42. 
128. S. REP. No. 4389, supra note 33, at 3823. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
132. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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[I]t would seem quite difficult for [a] lawyer or layman to compre-
hend a "constructive recess" of ... the Senate .... 
The Framers of the Constitution were providing against a real 
danger to the public interest, not an imaginary one. They had in mind 
a period of time during which it would be harmful if an office were 
not filled; not a constructive, inferred, or imputed recess, as opposed 
to an actual one. 
The theory of "constructive recess" constitutes a heavy draft upon 
the imagination .... 133 
Because the report addressed only constructive recesses, it 
should not be used to represent the Senate's position with regard to 
recess appointments during intrasession recesses.134 Even if one is 
so inclined, the report expressly acknowledges the Senate's recogni-
tion of the Framers' focus on recesses during which it would be 
harmfu,l if an office were not filled. As noted above, for the Framers 
those recesses were the longer intersession recesses, not the brief 
intrasession breaks.135 The report may thus be taken as the Sen-
ate's acknowledgment of the Recess Appointments Clause's origi-
nal meaning, the implication of which was to exclude intrasession 
recesses. 
Whatever the report's meaning in 1905, relying on it today 
would neglect an important difference between recesses at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, when the Senate was absent from 
its chambers, and recesses today, in which committees often meet 
and hold hearings.136 An example of the difference between the 
periods is illuminated by the report, which states: 
It can not by any possibility be deemed within the intent of the 
Constitution that when the Senate is in position to receive a nomina-
tion by the President, and, therefore, to exercise its function of advice 
and consent, the President can issue, without such advice and consent, 
commissions which will be lawful warrant for the assumption of the 
duties of a Federal office.137 
Because today's Senate receives presidential nominations during 
recesses138 and can pursue advice-and-consent procedures during 
133. S. REP. No. 4389, supra note 33, at 3823-24 (emphases omitted). 
134. For an example of such an attempted justification, see Statement of Points and Au-
thorities in Support of Defendant Thomas Ludlow Ashley's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on Count 1\vo of the First Amended Complaint at 13, Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56 
(D.D.C. 1993) (Civ. A. No. 93-0032-LFO) ("[T]here is no suggestion whatsoever in the re-
port that [an intrasession] recess must be of some particular length in order to be a recess 
within the meaning of the recess appointments clause."). 
135. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
136. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text. 
137. S. REP. No. 4389, supra note 33, at 3824. 
138. See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text. 
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these recesses, the recess envisioned by the Judiciary Committee in 
1905 is vastly different today, highlighting the diminished need for 
an expansive reading of the clause in light of current Senate 
practices.139 
2. Recent Sense-of-the-Senate Resolutions 
In response to controversial uses of the Recess Appointments 
Clause,140 senators have introduced several nonbinding sense-of-
the-Senate resolutions141 in the past decade. These resolutions 
have condemned appointments made during brief intrasession re-
cesses and have suggested restrictions on the use of the clause.142 
Although these resolutions do not have binding effect as acts of the 
legislature,143 they are significant because they provide an example 
of an interpretation of the clause that allows recess appointments 
during certain intrasession recesses.144 The sense-of-the-Senate res-
olutions have suggested allowing recess appointments during in-
trasession recesses of a particular length. Two resolutions have 
advocated restricting the power to intrasession recesses of at least 
thirty days and to intersession recesses. On August 9, 1984, then-
Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd introduced one such resolu-
tion, Senate Resolution 430, which stated that the recess appoint-
139. See infra section IV.A. 
140. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc. 23,234 (1984) (statement of Sen. Byrd). Senator Byrd 
declared that President Reagan used the clause to "avoid( ] serious and probing debate by 
the Senate on controversial issues." 130 id. He further noted that there was "no evidence 
that the needs of Government required any of (the 17 appointments made during the 23 day 
recess for the Fourth of July holiday and the Democratic Convention] to be made as recess 
appointments." 130 id. 
141. A sense-of-the-Senate resolution is technically a "Senate simple resolution." The 
influence of Senate simple resolutions is "restricted to the scope of authority of the Senate 
acting as a single body of Congress, and [such resolutions] are used for such purposes as 
expressing the sense of the Senate on a matter." FLOYD RIDDICK, SENATE PROCEDURE: 
PRECEDENTS AND PRAcnCES, S. Doc. No. 2, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 975 (1981). 
142. S. Res. 213, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 22,419 (1985) (suggesting limita-
tion of recess appointments to intersession recess or to intrasession recess of at least 30 days); 
S. Res. 194, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CoNG. REc. 17,679 (1985) (enacted) ("(R]ecess ap-
pointments should not be made to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
except under unusual circumstances and only for the purpose of fulfilling a demonstrable and 
urgent need in the administration of the Board's activities .... "); S. Res. 430, 98th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 130 CoNG. REC. 23,341 (1984) (limiting recess appointments to intersession recess or to 
intrasession recess of at least 30 days). 
In the 1950s, after President Eisenhower made recess appointments to the Supreme 
Court, the Senate passed a sense-of-the-Senate resolution condemning such appointments. 
S. Res. 334, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), reprinted in S. REP. No. 1893, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.1-
2 (1960). Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Potter Stewart and William Brennan ob-
tained such appointments before receiving permanent nominations and Senate confirmation. 
Id. at 3. The resolution seems to have been successful in dissuading subsequent presidents 
from making recess appointments to the Supreme Court. 
143. See supra note 141. 
144. Presidential legal advisers have also sanctioned certain intrasession recess appoint-
ments. See infra notes 158-89 and accompanying text. 
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ment power should be limited to "a formal termination of a session 
of the Senate, or to a recess of the Senate, protracted enough to 
prevent it from discharging its constitutional function of advising 
and consenting to executive nominations .... [N]o recess appoint-
ments should be made [during intrasession recesses] of less than 
thirty days. "145 
Byrd based his limit on a statute providing for a thirty-day limit 
on temporary appointments, a limit that has since been expanded to 
120 days.146 Even if the Senate found another statute providing 
some seemingly appropriate numerical line for intrasession re-
cesses, however, the line derived from such a statute would be only 
a matter of expediency, not a useful bright-line constitutional test. 
The Recess Appointments Clause refers simply to the Recess. This 
term can have two possible interpretations - intersession recesses 
or all recesses.147 The text of the clause does not imply an arbitrary 
numerical line to permit appointments during intrasession recesses 
of a certain length. The intersession-intrasession distinction, 
although not as clear a distinction as it was at the time of the Fram-
ers, provides the least arbitrary and only textually based bright line 
to determine which recesses allow the President to invoke the Re-
cess Appointments Clause. The Senate's resolutions, like its 1905 
Judiciary Committee Report, demonstrate its desire for a standard 
to limit the scope of the clause, but do little to provide constitu-
tional justification for the limits the resolutions propose. 
145. S. Res. 430, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CoNG. REc. 23,341 (1984). Senate Resolution 
213 contained identical language. S. Res. 213, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CoNG. Rec. 22,419 
(1985). 
At the time of the resolutions, Byrd claimed support for the 30-day limit based on the 
Vacancies Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378, 425-26 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 3345-3349 (1988)), which provides for succession at the top of, or within, executive 
departments. See 5 U.S.C. § 3348 (1982) (amended 1988) ("A vacancy caused by death or 
resignation may be filled temporarily .•. for not more than 30 days."); 130 CoNo. Rec. 
23,234 (1984) (statement of Sen. Byrd) ("30 days recommends itself to me [as the limit for 
intrasession recesses] because current statutory law allows the President to detail an individ-
ual to fill any executive office for a period of 30 days."). Congress, however, lengthened the 
statutory 30-day limit, which was "routinely missed or ignored, in part because 30 days [did] 
not appear to be enough time to recruit and nominate a presidential appointee." S. REP. No. 
317, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess.13 (1988). The lOOth Congress thus amended the Act to allow the 
President temporarily to fill vacancies in the executive branch for up to 120 days. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 3348(a) (1988) ("A vacancy caused by death or resignation may be filled temporarily ••• for 
not more than 120 days .... "). Consequently, the relevant statutory basis for a 30-day limit 
is vastly diminished. 
The only related statute with a 30cday limit is 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (1988), which provides that 
officers receiving recess appointments to positions that become vacant when the Senate is in 
session do not receive salaries from the Treasury. See infra note 177. Such a rule indicates 
congressional intent to limit recess appointments for vacancies occurring at various times, but 
does not address the type of recess allowing the President to invoke the clause. 
146. 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a) (1988). See supra note 145. 
147. See supra note 72. 
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B. Executive Interpretations of the Recess Appointments Clause 
Opinions of the presidential legal advisers have justified recess 
appointments during increasingly short intrasession recesses in re-
cent years. These opinions distinguish no lower limit to the length 
of the recess that would allow the President to invoke the clause. 
Like their legislative counterparts, however, these actors do not 
provide sufficient textual support from the Recess Appointments 
Clause to justify recess appointments during intrasession recesses. 
Nineteenth-century opinions148 of the Attorneys General sup-
ported presidents' use of intersession recess appointments. 
Although the Attorneys General did not specifically consider the 
validity of intrasession recess appointments,149 the language of their 
opinions demonstrates that they envisioned presidents exercising 
the recess appointment power only during intersession recesses. 
Their statements imply that no intrasession recesses actually existed 
because, if they did, then the recess and session would occur simul-
taneously.150 The Attorneys General provide further evidence that 
148. The opinions of the era primarily dealt with the dilemma of whether the President 
had the authority to make recess appointments to vacancies that initially occurred while the 
Senate was in session. This debate centered on the meaning of the term happen in the phrase 
"Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate." U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
The opinions of the Attorneys General were unanimous in holding that the President has the 
power to make such appointments, asserting that the term signifies happen to exist, and not 
happen to occur initially. E.g., 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 261(1889);17 Op. Atty. Gen. 521 (1883); 16 
Op. Atty. Gen. 522 (1880); 12 Op. Atty. Gen. 32 (1866); 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 523 (1846); 2 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 525 (1832); 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 631 (1823); see also United States v. Allocco, 305 
F.2d 704, 713 (2d Cir. 1962) ("The Attorneys-General of the United States, committed with 
the responsibility of advising the President concerning the scope of his constitutional powers, 
have held in a long and continuous line of opinions that the recess power extends to vacan-
cies which arise while the Senate is in session."), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 964 (1963). Such an 
interpretation was consistent with the purpose of the clause, to "keep ... offices filled." 1 
Op. Atty. Gen. at 632; see also 12 Op. Atty. Gen. at 35 ("[I]t is of the very essence of execu-
tive power that it should always be capable of exercise.") .. 
149. Other than the 1867 appointment mentioned above, see supra note 38 and accompa-
nying text, no president appears to have made an intrasession recess appointment in the 
nineteenth century. 
150. The Attorneys General referred to recess and session as mutually exclusive alterna-
tives. See, e.g., 12 Op. Atty. Gen. at 38-39 ("[T]he public exigency which requires the officer 
may be as cogent, and more cogent, during the recess than during the session .... [W]here 
the vacancy exists in the recess, whether it first occurred in the recess or in the preceeding 
session, the power to fill is in the President alone."); 2 Op. Atty. Gen. at 527 ("[A notice of 
vacancy] informs [the President] ... that [the vacancy] took place while the Senate was in 
session, and not during the recess."); 1 Op. Atty. Gen. at 633 ("[W]hether [a vacancy] arose 
during the session of the Senate, or during [its] recess, it equally requires to be filled."). 
The mutually exclusive approach taken by the Attorneys General leads to two possible 
interpretations of their views of the clause. Under the first, recess refers to all of the time 
when the Senate is not meeting as a whole, and session denotes the period in which they are 
meeting. As mentioned above, see supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text, such an inter-
pretation is inconsistent with the Framers' notions regarding, and subsequent development 
of, sessions as the yearly period of the Senate's meeting. The second interpretation, more in 
accord with the views of the Attorneys General, is that the President could make recess 
appointments only during the recess that was not part of the session, namely the intersession 
recess. 
2234 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:2204 
they only considered the clause to encompass intersession recesses 
by referring to the length of commissions of officials appointed dur-
ing recesses as approximately one year, the length of time from an 
intersession recess until the end of the subsequent session of the 
Senate.151 
Attorney General Philander Knox explicitly stated the assump-
tion of his predecessors that the recess appointment power applied 
only during intersession recesses in his 1901 opinion advising Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt not to recess-appoint an appraiser at the 
port of New York during an eighteen-day intrasession recess, last-
ing from December 19, 1901, until January 6, 1902. The Attorney 
General asserted that "in the many elaborate opinions of my prede-
cessors ... no case is presented in which an appointment during [an 
intrasession recess] was involved."152 Knox drew a distinction, still 
accurate today, between an intrasession recess, which was a 
"merely temporary suspension of business from day to day, or, 
when exceeding three days, for such brief periods over holidays as 
are well recognized and established,"153 and an intersession recess, 
which was "the period after the final adjournment of Congress for 
the session, and before the next session begins."154 The Attorney 
General then specifically advised the President not to make in-
trasession recess appointments: 
It is this period following the final adjournment for the session which is 
the recess during which the President has power to fill vacancies by 
granting commissions which shall expire at the end of the next ses-
sion. Any intermediate temporary adjournment is not such recess, 
although it may be a recess in the general and ordinary use of that 
term.155 
Knox specifically rejected the idea that the President could in-
voke the clause during lengthy intrasession recesses: "It may be 
that Congress might 'temporarily adjourn' for several months as 
well as several days, and thus seriously curtail the President's power 
of making recess appointments. But this argument from inconven-
ience ... can not be admitted to obscure the true principles and 
distinctions ruling the point."156 The Attorney General also recog-
nized that no constitutionally supportable line could be drawn al-
lowing presidents to invoke the clause only during certain 
intrasession recesses: "[If the President could make a recess ap-
pointment during this eighteen-day intrasession recess], I see no 
151. See, e.g., 12 Op. Atty. Gen. at 41 ("[T]he officer appointed to fill the vacancy [of 
marshal] can scarcely hold for an entire year."). 
152. 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 599, 602 (1901). 
153. 23 Op. Atty. Gen. at 601. 
154. 23 Op. Atty. Gen. at 601. 
155. 23 Op. Atty. Gen. at 601 (first and third emphases added). 
156. 23 Op. Atty. Gen. at 603. 
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reason why such an appointment should not be. made during any 
[intrasession recess], as from Thursday or Friday until the following 
Monday."157 Knox thus drew a clear distinction between interses-
sion and intrasession recesses, one that allowed the President to in-
voke the clause only during intersession recesses. 
Subsequent presidential advisers, however, have failed to follow 
Knox's reasoning, and have not provided strong justifications for 
their divergence from Knox's interpretation. Attorney General 
Harry Daugherty wrote an opinion in 1921 acquiescing in President 
Warren Harding's decision to make a recess appointment during a 
twenty-eight day intrasession recess, from August 24 until Septem-
ber 21, 1921. Daugherty claimed that the term recess should be 
given a "practical," and not a "technical," construction, and that 
"the real question" was "whether in a practical sense the Senate is 
in session so that its advice and consent can be obtained."158 
Daugherty drew support for his opinion from the purpose of the 
clause,159 a nineteenth-century judicial decision,160 and the 1905 
Senate Judiciary Committee report.161 These sources of authority 
do not, however, provide constitutional justification for intrasess~on 
recess appointments. First, the purpose of keeping offices filled was 
not an absolute goal of the Framers, a~ evidenced by the elaborate 
system of checks and balances, most notably, the requirement of 
Senate confirmation of appointments.162 Second, notwithstanding 
Daugherty's assertion that Gould v. United States163 "is in accord-
ance with my views,"164 this court of claims case involved the pay-
ment of recess appointees' salaries, not a deterinination of what 
type of recess allows the President to invoke the clause.165 Third, 
Daugherty's reliance on the Judiciary Committee Report166 was 
misplaced, because, as noted above, that report specifically re-
sponded to a particular use of the Recess Appointments Clause -
the "constructive recess" - and therefore does not delineate defin-
itively the scope of the Recess Appointments Clause.167 
157. 23 Op. Atty. Gen. at 603. 
158. 33 Op. Atty. Gen. 20, 21-22 (1921) (emphasis omitted). 
159. Daugherty relied on his predecessors' statements that the purpose was to keep of-
fices filled. 33 Op. Atty. Gen. at 23 (quoting 23 Op. Atty. Gen. at 35, 36, 38); see also supra 
note 148. 
160. 33 Op. Atty. Gen. at 23-24 (citing Gould v. United States, 19 Ct. CI. 593 (1884) 
(holding that an Army paymaster is entitled to payment for the period in which he was a 
recess appointee)). 
161. 33 Op. Atty. Gen. at 24 (citing S. REP. No. 4389, supra note 33). 
162. See supra section 11.B. 
163. 19 Ct. CI. 593 (1884). 
164. 33 Op. Atty. Gen. at 23-24. 
165. Gould, 19 Ct. CI. at 595-96. 
166. See supra section III.A.1. 
167. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text. 
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As Daugherty recognized, no clear test exists for determining 
which intrasession recesses are of a length sufficient to allow the 
President to invoke the clause. The Attorney General identified 
this line-drawing problem, admitting that such a pursuit involves a 
"line of demarcation [that] can not be accurately drawn."168 As an 
example, Daugherty asserted that the President would have the 
power during the twenty-eight-day recess in question, but that "an 
adjournment for 5 or even 10 days [cannot] be said to constitute the 
recess intended by the Constitution."169 Daugherty resolved the 
line-drawing problem by vesting the President with "a large, 
although not unlimited, discretion to determine when there is a real 
and genuine recess making it impossible for him to receive the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate."170 Daugherty further argued that 
"[e]very presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of 
whatever action he may take."171 Thus Daugherty escaped the line-
drawing dilemma by appealing to a presumption in favor of the 
constitutionality of presidential discretion in defining the Recess. 
This appeal, however, ignores the text of the Constitution, which 
defines and limits executive authority. If the Attorney General had 
paid primary attention to the text of the Recess Appointments 
Clause, he would not have encountered line-drawing problems, be-
cause the text of the clause refers only to the Recess. The text does 
not indicate, for example, the lengthy recess, or - analogous to the 
Pocket Veto Clause172 - a recess preventing Senate confirmation, 
phrases that might lead to line-drawing problems because of their 
qualifications of the Recess. 
Despite Daugherty's difficulties in justifying intrasession recess 
appointments, his successors have willingly followed his example in 
supporting such appointments. For instance, a 1960 opinion by Act-
ing Attorney General Lawrence Walsh affirmed the President's use 
of the recess appointment power during a thirty-six-day intrasession 
recess.173 The opinion relied on a number of sources, including pre-
vious opinions by Attorneys General, an opinion by the Comptrol-
ler General that followed the rationale of Daugherty's 1921 
Attorney General opinion in allowing intrasession recess appoint-
ments, 174 and a Supreme Court decision on the Pocket Veto 
Clause175 that downplayed the intersession-intrasession distinc-
168. 33 Op. Atty. Gen. at 25. 
169. 33 Op. Atty. Gen. at 25. 
170. 33 Op. Atty. Gen. at 25. 
171. 33 Op. Atty. Gen. at 25. 
172. See supra note 91. 
173. 41 Op. Atty. Gen. 463 {1960). 
174. 28 Comp. Gen. 30 (1948). 
175. See supra note 91. 
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tion.176 These sources do not, however, provide any additional con-
stitutional arguments for allowing intrasession recess appointments. 
The Comptroller General's opinion focused on recess appointees' 
salaries under 5 U.S.C. § 56177 and on whether the President made a 
recess appointment encompassed within the statute's "termination 
of the session"178 provision, rather than on whether the recess al-
lowed the President to make recess appointments.179 Similarly, 
Walsh's opinion notes the Supreme Court's decision in the Pocket 
Veto Case, in which the Court determined whether an adjournment 
"'prevent[ed]' the President from returning the bill to the House in 
which it originated within the time allowed."180 Walsh drew on the 
reasoning of the Pocket Veto Case to conclude that the President 
"ha[ s] the power to grant recess appoin~ments during the [intrases-
sion recess from July 3 to August 8, 1960] because that recess 'pre-
vents' [the Senate] from advising and consenting to Executive 
nominations."181 Walsh was, however, too quick to apply the logic 
of one constitutional clause to the analysis of another. The dangers 
lurking in too facile an analogy are illustrated in the different texts 
of the clauses: the Pocket Veto Clause specifically refers to "an Ad-
journment [that] prevent[s a bill's] Return"182 whereas the Recess 
Appointments Clause refers only to the Recess, not a Recess that 
176. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929) (holding that the test for whether the 
President could pocket veto a bill was whether a congressional adjournment prevented the 
President from returning the bill to the House in which it originated within the time allowed). 
177. This statute provided that: 
No money shall be paid from the Treasury, as salary, to any person appointed during 
the recess of the Senate, to fill a vacancy in any existing office, if the vacancy existed 
while the Senate was in session and was by law required to be filled by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, until such appointee has been confirmed by the Sen-
ate. The provisions of this section shall not apply (a) if the vacancy arose within thirty 
days prior to the termination of the session of the Senate; or (b) if, at the time of the 
termination of the session of the Senate, a nomination for such office, other than the 
nomination of a person appointed during the preceding recess of the Senate, was pend-
ing before the Senate for its advice and consent; or (c) if a nomination for such office 
was rejected by the Senate within thirty days prior to the termination of the session and 
a person other than the one whose nomination was rejected thereafter receives a recess 
commission: Provided, That a nomination to fill such vacancy under (a), (b), or (c) of 
this section, shall be submitted to the Senate not later than forty days after the com-
mencement of the next succeeding session of the Senate. 
5 U.S.C. § 56 (1940) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (1988)). Congress instituted a poten-
tial limit to the Recess Appointments Clause in using its spending power to prohibit salaries 
for recess appointments made at certain times. The statute, however, in both its original and 
its amended versions, does not substantially limit presidents' power to make recess appoint-
ments because the majority of vacancies first occur during periods not encompassed by the 
statute. -
178. 5 U.S.C. § 56 (1940) Subsequent enactments of the statute have replaced termination 
of the session with end of the session. See 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (1988). 
179. 28 Comp. Gen. 30 (1948). 
180. 41 Op. Atty. Gen. 463, 469 (1960) (quoting 279 U.S. at 680). 
181. 41 Op. Atty. Gen. at 469. 
182. See supra note 91. 
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prevents confirmation.183 Thus, Walsh, like Daugherty, failed to 
provide a concrete textual justification for his conclusion that presi-
dents can use the recess appointment power during intrasession 
recesses. 
Attorneys General have not been the only executive officials 
who have interpreted the Recess Appointments Clause. The Office 
of Legal Counsel ("OLC"), throughout the past fifteen years, has 
written opinions for the President supporting intrasession recess 
appointments made during increasingly short recesses. For exam-
ple, the OLC wrote opinions in 1979184 and 1989185 sanctioning ap-
pointments during thirty-three-day intrasession recesses, and the 
Office wrote a 1992 opinion supporting use of the power during an 
eighteen-day recess.186 The 1992 opinion relied on previous execu-
tive opinions supporting appointments during short recesses, in-
cluding Daugherty's 1921 opinion, but was unable to reconcile this 
conclusion with Daugherty's admonition that "an adjournment for 
5 or even 10 days" would not be sufficient "to constitute the recess 
intended by the Constitution."187 Moreover, this decision contra-
vened a previous opinion from the OLC that warned that "[t]his 
Office has cautioned against a recess appointment during an 18-day 
intrasession recess. "188 
Since Daugherty's "practical" construction of the clause and his 
presumption of constitutionality in favor of the President when he 
makes recess appointments, the opinions of presidential legal advis-
ers have consistently avoided clear textual analysis of the Recess 
Appointments Clause in advising the President that he can make 
recess appointments during intrasession recesses. Although these 
opinions have formed a background in which each subsequent opin-
ion echoes the conclusions of its predecessors, the opinions have 
elevated the importance of the purposes of the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause - especially those favoring the President - over the 
constitutional text. Courts should not defer to these opinions' pri-
mary emphasis on purposes, but should instead begin their analysis 
by examining the text of the clause.189 If courts are inclined to look 
183. Moreover, the differences between recess and adjournment are significant; if the 
Framers wanted to address the same type of Senate absence, they would have selected identi-
cal language for both clauses. Cf. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570-71 (1840) 
(arguing that because "every word [of the Constitution] must have its due force," the words 
"treaty," "compact," and "agreement" in Article I, § 10 cannot mean the same thing.); see 
supra note 74. 
184. 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 314 (1979). 
185. 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 325 (1989) (preliminary print). 
186. 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 15 (1992) (preliminary print). 
187. 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 16 n.2 (quoting 33 Op. Atty. Gen. 20, 25 (1921)). 
188. 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 327 n.2 (emphasis added) (citing Memorandum to the 
Files from Herman Marcuse, Attorney-Adviser, Office of Legal Counsel, Jan. 28, 1985). 
189. See supra note 69. 
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beyond the text, however, the next Part shows that they will find 
very little in the clause's original purpose of relevance in today's 
political world. 
IV. CURRENT PRACTICE AND THE PURPOSES OF THE CLAUSE 
The phrase the Recess can, at most, refer to two possible mean-
ings of recess - intersession recesses and all recesses.190 This Part 
takes an independent look at the modern political environment in 
order to determine which of these possibilities best comports with 
the original purposes of the clause as they operate today. Even 
though the frequency and length of intrasession recesses have in-
creased in the past twenty-five years, the governmental paralysis 
that the Framers feared is absent in today's political setting. For 
this reason, courts should be especially reluctant to depart from the 
text of the Recess Appointments Clause to enforce a purpose that 
no longer applies. 
This Part describes how modern practices affect the application 
of the clause today. Section IV.A examines current Senate activity. 
This section first observes that even though the occurrence of in-
trasession recesses has dramatically increased, the typical interses-
sion recess remains longer than the usual intrasession recess. This 
section also finds that allowing recess appointments during today's 
intrasession recesses would result in divergent and overly lengthy 
commissions. Next, the section observes that the complete shut-
down of activity during recesses which the Framers envisioned does 
not characterize today's intrasession and intersession recesses. 
Rather, committees often continue meeting during a recess, thus 
providing the first step of their advice and consent191 as they con-
sider - through the use of hearings - presidential nominees. Sec-
tion IV.B describes the array of statutory mechanisms that 
supplement the Recess Appointments Clause in filling vacancies. 
These statutes, with automatic succession or holdover provisions, 
ensure that the executive branch fills vacancies smoothly, further 
diminishing the possibility of governmental paralysis which the 
Framers feared. 
A. Changes in Senate Activity 
Today's Senate schedule is far different from that which the 
Framers envisioned. The average session has grown longer, short-
ening the intersession recesses.192 In addition, the frequency of in-
190. See supra note 72. 
191. See infra notes 208-13 and accompanying text. 
192. CoNGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 20, at 580-90. 
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trasession recesses has increased in the past fifty years.193 Yet such 
recesses generally remain shorter than intersession recesses. Most 
intersession recesses last for at least one month, and some last for 
three months.194 In contrast, the overwhelming majority of in-
trasession recesses last less than twenty days.195 Only four intrases-
sion recesses in history have exceeded sixty days, and none of these 
occurred in the past forty years.196 
These changes in the Senate schedule affect the length of com-
. missions granted under the clause. Because today's session is much 
longer than the intersession recess, all officers receiving intersession 
recess appointments receive commissions of roughly the same 
length, approximately one year.197 On the other hand, when presi-
dents invoke the clause during an intrasession recess - no matter 
how long - they may create commissions up to twice as long as 
those granted to intersession recess appointees.198 The lengths of 
commissions of intrasession recess appointees can vary from one to 
two years, depending on when in the Senate's schedule the recess 
occurs. Thus, in contrast to intersession recess appointees, all of 
whom serve approximately the same amount of time, intrasession 
recess appointees have widely divergent commissions. Even though 
today's sessions last longer than previous Senate sessions,199 ensur-
ing that the President has more time to nominate, and the Senate 
has more time to consider, a permanent officer for a position, all 
officers receiving intersession recess appointments will remain in 
office for approximately the same amount of time. On the other 
hand, the Senate has up to two sessions to confirm officers granted 
recess appointments during intrasession recesses at the beginning of 
a Senate session. 
This extra session, in effect, doubles the commissions of recess 
appointees. This longer commission gives the President an incen-
tive to wait until the first intrasession recess after an intersession 
193. Id. 
194. Approximately 85% - 193 out of 228 from the beginning of the Republic until the 
start of the 102d Congress - of intersession recesses have exceeded one month. Id. 
195. Approximately 87% - 207 out of 238 from the beginning of the Republic until the 
start of the 102d Congress - of intrasession recesses have been less than 20 days. Id. 
196. 1\vo of these recesses occurred in the first session of the 40th Congress, in 1867: a 
94-day recess (from March 30 to July 3, 1867) and a 124-day recess (from July 20 to Novem-
ber 21, 1867). The next intrasession recess occurred in the first session of the 78th Congress, 
a 68-day recess from July 8 to September 14, 1943. The final such recess occurred in the 
second session of the 81st Congress, a 65-day break, from September 23 to November 27, 
1950. Id. 
197. The commissions would be approximately the same length because all appointments 
made during a short intersession recess occur at relatively the same time and last throughout 
the longer Senate session. 
198. For an illustration of such a phenomenon, see infra text accompanying notes 200-01. 
199. See CoNGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 20, ~t 580-90. 
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recess to make a recess appointment. President Bush's appoint-
ment of Thomas Ludlow Ashley during the first intrasession recess 
of the first session of the 103d Congress provides one such example. 
Instead of appointing Ashley during the intersession recess lasting 
from October 8, 1992, until January 5, 1993,200 so that his commis-
sion might last until December 1993, Bush waited until the intrases-
sion recess from January 7 to January 20, 1993, to make the recess 
appointment, extending the prospective commission until approxi-
mately October 1994.201 Allowing recess appointments during in-
trasession recesses thus leads to unusual results that may tilt the 
balance of power in the appointment process. 
Modem intrasession recesses also do not pose the danger antici-
pated by the Framers of prolonged Senate absences during which 
vacancies would remain unfilled. The Framers anticipated six-to-
nine-month periods in which the Senate would not be able to pro-
vide its advice and consent.202 Today's typical seven- or fourteen-
day intrasession recess, in contrast, does not threaten such govern-
mental paralysis. 
The accessibility of the confirmation process - in particular, 
committee consideration of nominations - provides another con-
trast to the schedule the Framers expected.203 Today's Senate can 
receive messages from the President during recesses. In recent 
years, on the first day of a Congress, the Secretary of the Senate has 
been given authority, which lasts for the duration of the Congress, 
to receive messages from the President204 during Senate recesses.20s 
Many of the messages received are nominations, which the Secre-
tary of the Senate refers to the appropriate committee for the com-
mencement of the advice-and-consent process.206 
200. 138 CoNa. REc. Sl8,258 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992). 
201. See supra notes 6-16 and accompanying text. 
202. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. 
203. Today's recesses do not even fit the 1905 Judiciary Committee Report's definition of 
recess as the time when the Senate owed "no duty of attendance," when, because of the 
legislature's absence, "[the Senate could] not receive communications from the President or 
p'articipate as a body in making appointments." S. REP. No. 4389, supra note 33, at 3823. See 
supra section III.A.1. 
204. The authority also typically includes receiving messages - other than House bills, 
joint resolutions, and concurrent resolutions - from the House of Representatives. See, e.g., 
139 CoNa. REc. S9 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1993) (statement of Sen. Mitchell). 
205. A typical grant of authority was made on the first day of the 103d Congress, when 
Senator Mitchell asked for unanimous consent that "for the duration of the 103d Congress, 
when the Senate is in recess or adjournment, the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to 
receive messages from the President of the United States ... and that they be appropriately 
referred." 139 id.; see also 137 CoNa. REc. S7 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991); 131 CoNa. REc. 13 
(1985). 
206. See, e.g., Nominations Submitted to the Senate, 29 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1032 
(June 1, 1993) (Clinton submits nomination of Jean Kennedy Smith to be ambassador to 
Ireland during intrasession recess from May 28 to June 7, 1993); 139 CoNa. REc. S53 (daily 
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Moreover, committees can initiate the process of confirming 
nominees during all recesses. The standing rules of the Senate ex-
plicitly give committees full po"'.ers even during recesses: 
Each standing committee, including any subcommittee of any such 
committee, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such 
times and places during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods 
of the Senate, to require ... the attendance of such witnesses and the 
production of such correspondence, books, papers, and documents, to 
take such testimony and to make such expenditures . . . as may be 
authorized ... . 201 
Senate committees play a crucial role in the confirmation pro-
cess,208 as they often conduct the most thorough examination of the 
presidential nominee. The first step of the advice-and-consent pro-
cess occurs when the committee holds hearings on the nominee. In 
accordance with the provisions of the Senate's standing rules, com-
mittees have conducted a wide array of hearings, including nomina-
tion hearings, during both intersession and intrasession recesses. 
For instance, during the intrasession recess lasting from July 1 until 
July 13, 1993, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs concluded hearings on three executive officers.209 Prior to 
presidential inaugurations, when the President-elect assembles the 
Cabinet, these committees frequently act on nominations made 
even during recesses. During the intrasession recess from January 7 
to January 20, 1993, Senate committees considered nearly every one 
of President-elect Clinton's cabinet nominations.21° Committees 
ed. Jan. 7, 1993) (Bush submits approximately 300 military nominations during intrasession 
recess from January 7 to January 20, 1993). 
207. SLACK, supra note ~l, § 26.1, at 50 (emphasis added). 
208. One Supreme Court Justice has emphasized the importance of committees to the 
operation of the legislature, noting that committees could be viewed "for all practical pur-
poses [as] Congress itself." Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 344 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that a court could not enjoin a congressional 
committee from distributing its report). 
209. The Committee concluded hearings on the nominations of Richard S. Carnell to be 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Institutions, G. Edward DeSeve to be Chief 
Financial Officer of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Susan 
Gaffney to be Inspector General of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
139 CoNG. REc. D762 (daily ed. July 13, 1993). Other examples of committees' consideration 
of presidential nominations during recesses occurred during the intrasession recess from Oc-
tober 1 to October 3, 1993, when the Labor and Human Resources Committee held hearings 
on the nomination of William Gould to be a member of the National Labor Relations Board, 
Today in Congress, WASH. PoST, Oct. 1, 1993, at A16; during the intrasession recess from 
November 20 to November 30, 1987, when the Armed Services Committee held hearings on 
the nomination of Samuel Lessey, Jr., to be director of the Selective Service, Today in Con· 
gress, WASH. PoST, Nov. 24, 1987, at A4; and during the intersession recess from November 
22, 1989, to January 23, 1990, when the Armed Services Committee held hearings on the 
nomination of Victor Stello, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary of Energy, Today in Congress, 
WASH. PoST, Dec. 19, 1989, at AS. 
210. The committees ordered that the following prospective nominations be favorably 
reported to the Senate for consideration: Mike Espy to be Secretary of Agriculture, by the 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Henry Cisneros to be Secretary of Hous-
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also considered cabinet nominees during Senate recesses in prior 
administrations, including those of President Bush211 and President 
Reagan.212 
These numerous examples of Senate committee activity during 
recesses illustrate the legislature's continuing involvement in the 
advice-and-consent process. Even though the Senate as a whole 
cannot act on a nomination during a recess,213 committee consider-
ation of presidential nominees presents the possibility that the ad-
vice-and-consent process may commence. In conjunction with 
short intrasession recesses and the ability to receive messages from 
the President, Senate committee activity during recesses thus mini-
mizes the possibility of governmental paralysis resulting from un-
filled vacancies. 
ing and Urban Development, by the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; 
Hazel O'Leary to be Secretary of Energy, by the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
sources; Carol Browner to be Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, by the 
Committee on Environment and Public Works; Donna Shalala to be Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, by the Committee on Finance; Roger Altman to be Deputy Secretary of the 
Treasury, by the Committee on Finance; Michael Kantor to be United States Trade Repre-
sentative, by the Committee on Finance; Warren Christopher to be Secretary of State, by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations; Leon Panetta to be Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget, by the Committee on Governmental Affairs; Robert Reich to be Secretary of 
Labor, by the Committee on Labor and Human Resources; and Richard Riley to be Secre-
tary of Education, by the Committee on Labor and Human Resources. 139 CONG. REc. 
D46-48 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1993). 
In addition, committees concluded hearings during the recess on the prospective nomina-
tions of Federico Peiia to be Secretary of Transportation, by the Committee on Environment 
and Public Works; and Alice Rivlin to be Deputy Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, by the Committee on Governmental Affairs. 139 id. at D47. 
Finally, committees commenced hearings during the recess on other potential nominees: 
Bruce Babbitt to be Secretary of the Interior, by the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources; and Zoe Baird to be Attorney General, by the Committee on the Judiciary. Id. at 
D47-48. 
211. During the intrasession recess from January 4 until January 20, 1989, the Committee 
on Foreign Relations favorably reported the nominations of James Baker III to be Secretary 
of State, and the Labor and Human Resources Committee favorably reported the 
nominaiton of Elizabeth Dole to be Secretary of Labor. 135 CONG. REc. D16 (daily ed. Jan. 
19, 1989). The Senate also held hearings on then-President-elect Bush's choice for the Direc-
tor of the Office of Management and Budget, Richard Darman. 135 id. 
212. For example, on January 14, 1981, the Committee on Foreign Relations held hear-
ings on the prospective nomination of Alexander M. Haig, Jr., to be Secretary of State, and 
the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources held hearings on the prospective nomina-
tions of James G. Watt to be Secretary of the Interior and James B. Edwards to be Secretary 
of Energy. 127 CoNG. REc. 264 (1981). On January 15, 1981, the Committee on the Judici-
ary held hearings on the prospective nomination of William French Smith to be Attorney 
General. 127 id. 
213. Nevertheless, during recesses, nearly all of the Senators may in fact be present. Let-
ter from Senators David Pryor, John Glenn, George Mitchell, Wendell Ford, and Robert 
Byrd to President George Bush (Jan. 12, 1993) (asserting that "[v]irtually every Member of 
the Senate serves on one of the committees that (met] during the (January 7 to January 20] 
adjournment to consider prospective Executive appointments"). 
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B. Statutory Supplements to the Recess Appointments Clause 
An examination of statutes that Congress has enacted to fill va-
cancies in the executive branch further demonstrates the limited 
role of the recess appointment power in today's political arena. 
Such statutes minimize the possibility of governmental paralysis re-
sulting from unfilled vacancies by ensuring that many executive of-
fices remain filled. 
The Vacancy Act214 is the primary statute governing succession 
in executive departments. Like the Recess Appointments Clause, 
the Vacancy Act seeks to "ensure that executive vacancies [are] 
promptly filled"215 through, for example, the use of automatic suc-
cession provisions.216 The Vacancy Act provides for automatic suc-
cession for the heads of executive agencies or military departments. 
The Act provides: "When the head of an Executive agency (other 
than the General Accounting Office) or military department dies, 
resigns, or is sick or absent, his first assistant ... shall perform the 
duties of the office until a successor is appointed or the absence or 
sickness stops."217 Automatic succession also applies to 
subordinate offices, as it provides that the first assistant to "an of-
ficer of a bureau of an Executive department or military depart-
ment, whose appointment is not vested in the head of the 
department" will assume the officer's powers until a successor is 
appointed or the officer's sickness or absence ceases.218 Automatic 
succession provisions thus complement the Recess Appointments 
Clause by ensuring that vacancies will be filled even if the vacancy 
arises during an intrasession recess.219 These provisions, like Sen-
ate activity during recesses, diminish the possibility of vacancies in 
federal offices.220 
214. 5 u.s.c. §§ 3345-3349 (1988). 
215. S. REP. No. 317, supra note 145, at 13. This purpose was reiterated in recent amend-
ments to the Act that extended the temporary appointments to 120 days. 134 CoNo. REC. 
19,991 (1988) (statement of Sen. Glenn) ("This provision clearly encourages the President to 
fill vacancies promptly."). 
216. The present Act allows for those assuming office to remain for up to 120 days. S 
u.s.c. § 3348 (1988). 
217. 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (1988). An example of this provision is 28 U.S.C. § 508 (1988), 
which provides that the Deputy Attorney General may exercise the duties of Attorney Gen-
eral when the latter position becomes vacant. This provision further allows the Associate 
Attorney General to act as Attorney General if the Deputy Attorney General is unavailable 
to act. 
218. 5 u.s.c. § 3346 (1988). 
219. The Vacancy Act also provides for discretionary succession, as the President "may 
direct the head [or another officer] of another Executive department or military department 
... whose appointment is vested in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, to perform the duties of the office." 5 U.S.C. § 3347 (1988). 
220. Although courts have construed the Vacancy Act narrowly, so that "the President 
[has] authority to make interim appointments only when the express conditions of the Act 
are satisfied," Olympic Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Director, Off. Thrift Supervision, 732 F. 
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Several other statutes, including those allowing federal officials 
to choose officers to fill vacancies, apply to various executive de-
partments and contribute to the uninterrupted operation of govern-
ment in the event of vacancies.221 The Attorney General, for 
Supp. 1183, 1197 (D.D.c.), appeal dismissed as moot, 903 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1990), even a 
strict reading of the statute results in the filling of a substantial number or vacancies. The Act 
provides for the filling of vacancies for the heads of executive departments and the officers o! 
bureaus. For the positions to which the Vacancy Act applies, the 120-day commissions that 
the Act grants ensure that positions will remain staffed, thereby preventing governmental 
paralysis while the President is selecting a permanent officer. 
Some of the statutes' provisions for filling positions will not fill all vacancies so that the 
President can still utilize the recess appointment power. See Staebler v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 
585 (D.D.C. 1979} (holding that holdover provision in Federal Election Campaign Act did 
not fill a vacancy). Whether holdover provisions fill vacancies thus depends upon the Ian· 
guage of the holdover provision. A Federal Election Campaign Act holdover does not fill a 
vacancy because the tenure of the holdover ends when the "successor has taken office as a 
member of the Commission." 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a}(2)(B} (1988). On the other hand, the hold· 
over provision of the Postal Service Act, see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text, fills 
the vacancy until a " 'successor has qualified,' i.e., has been nominated by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate." Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56, 58 (D.D.C. 1993). Such provi-
sions fill some vacancies, but the President may still invoke the clause to fill other positions. 
221. It is possible, nonetheless, for a vacancy to occur that is covered by neither the Ya· 
cancy Act nor another statute. Such a situation occurred in 1973, when President Nixon 
appointed Howard J. Phillips to be Acting Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity 
("OEO"). Digest of Other White House Announcemnts, 9 WeEKL Y CoMP. PRES. Doc. 121, 
122 (Jan. 31, 1973). Section 3347 of the Vacancy Act did not cover Phillips for two reasons. 
First, the OEO was not an executive or military department See Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. 
Supp. 1363, 1367 (D.D.C. 1973). Second, when appointed, Phillips was an OEO Associate 
Director for Program Review, a post not subject to Senate confirmation. 360 F. Supp. at 
1366. Thus, Phillips was not "another officer of an Executive department or military depart· 
ment, whose appointment is vested in the President, by and with the advice and consent or 
the Senate •.•. " 5 U.S.C. § 3347 (1988). 
Phillips's appointment also illustrates how presidents can use the appointments process to 
evade the intent of Congress. N"ixon appointed Phillips not to lead the OEO but to eliminate 
it. Indeed, the budget N"ixon submitted to Congress two days prior to Phillips's appointment 
contained no funding for the OEO despite Congress's authorization that the agency continue 
through June 30, 1974. See Act of Sept 19, 1972, Pub. L No. 92-424, § 3(c)(2}, 86 StaL 688, 
688-89; OFFICE OF MANAGEMENr & BUDGET, BUDGET OP me UNITED STATES GoVERN-
MENT, FISCAL YEAR 1974, at 122 (1973). Upon assuming office - in fact, two days before 
N"ixon officially named him - Phillips issued a memorandum instructing the OEO's Com· 
munity Action Agencies to use their funds only for the purpose or financing their termina· 
tion. Local 2677, Am. Fedn. of Govt. Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 65-66 (D.D.C. 
1973). 
In response to these events, several members of the Senate sought an injunction to have 
Phillips removed. On June 11, 1973, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
ruled that the President could only appoint an officer if he had the advice and consent of the 
Senate, unless there was statutory authority to do otherwise or unless the Senate was in 
recess. Williams, 360 F. Supp. at 1367-68. The court noted that because Congress had ex· 
pressly provided for the details of succession for other agencies through statutes, it had to 
presume that Congress's failure to do so in the case of the OEO was intentional. 360 F. 
Supp. at 1370-71. 
By the end of 1973, Nixon had proved partially successful in his attempt to dismantle the 
OEO. Several of the OEO's programs were transferred to other agencies, leaving the OEO 
with three programs, one of which was the predecessor to the Legal Services Corporation -
the agency that Presidents Reagan and Bush would seek to weaken through recess appoint· 
ments. See Complete Dismantling of OEO Halted in 1973, 29 CoNG. Q. Au.IANAC SSS 
(1974); supra note 29. 
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example, has the authority to appoint U.S. attorneys,222 marshals,223 
and trustees224 in districts where such an office becomes vacant. 
The appointees' commissions last for varying lengths of time,225 but 
all such appointments serve the purpose of keeping offices filled.226 
_ In addition, many statutes governing executive agencies227 have 
holdover provisions, which allow an officer to remain in office until 
a replacement assumes the position.228 Such provisions have been 
utilized by, for example, the Federal Election Commission,229 the 
Postal Board of Governors,230 the Federal Housing Fmance 
Board,231 and the Legal Services Corporation.232 Again, these pro-
visions ensure that positions essential to the effective functioning of 
government remain staffed. 
The limited purposes of the clause, in light of modern develop-
ments discussed in this Part, are more consistent with the restriction 
of the power to the intersession recess. This conclusion comports 
with the textual analysis of the Recess Appointments Clause and 
supports confining the recess appointment power to the closest ana-
logue in today's schedule to the recess envisioned by the Framers 
- the intersession recess. 
CONCLUSION 
The Framers drafted the Recess Appointments Clause to allow 
the President unilaterally to make appointments to keep the gov-
222. 28 u.s.c. § 546 (1988). 
223. 28 u.s.c. § 562 (1988). 
224. 28 u.s.c. § 585 (1988). 
225. For example, temporary U.S. attorneys serve until either a successor has been ap-
pointed or 120 days have expired, 28 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1988}; temporary marshals serve either 
until a successor has been chosen, until the thirtieth day following the end or the next session 
of the Senate has expired, or until the thirtieth day after the Senate refuses to give its advice 
and consent, 28 U.S.C. § 562(b) (1988); and temporary trustees serve until a successor has 
been appointed, 28 U.S.C. § 585(a} (1988). 
226. The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board serves as another ex-
ample of the powers of discretionary selection the President may utilize to fill a vacancy. 29 
U.S.C. § 153(d) (1988) ("In case of a vacancy in the office of the General Counsel the Presi-
dent is authorized to designate the officer or employee who shall act as General Counsel 
during such vacancy .... "). 
227. Statutes creating agencies usually provide for members to be appointed by the Presi-
dent and confirmed by the Senate. 
228. For potential differences among holdover provisions, see s11pra note 220. 
229. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(2}(B) (1988) ("A member oC the Commission may serve on the 
Commission after the expiration of his or her term until his or her successor has taken office 
as a member of the Commission."). 
230. 39 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1988) ("A Governor may continue to serve after the expiration 
of his term until his successor has qualified, but not to exceed one year ... ). See mpra note 14. 
231. 12 U.S.C. § 1422a(d)(l) (Supp. IV 1992} ("Each director may continue to serve until 
a successor has been appointed and qualified."}. 
232 42 U.S.C. § 2996c(b) (1988) ("Each member or the Board shall continue to serve 
until the successor to such member has been appointed and qualified."}. 
June 1994] Note - Recess Appointments 2247 
ernment functioning during the six-to-nine-month intersession re-
cesses they envisioned, in which Senators dispersed throughout the· 
country would be unable to provide their advice and consent. The 
clause provides that the President may make such appointments 
during the Recess. The particular language the Framers chose indi-
cates that they intended to restrict the meaning of Recess to inter-
session recesses. This meaning limits the impact of the recess 
appointment power on the carefully designed system of checks and 
balances the Framers intended to inform the general appointment 
power. 
Executive and legislative opinions, by failing to consider ade-
quately the text of the Recess Appointments Clause, do not dis-
place the conclusion reached from textua,I analysis. Even in light of 
the dramatic changes since the time of the Framers in how vacan-
cies in the executive branch are filled, interpreting the meaning of 
Recess to include intersession recesses but not intrasession recesses 
remains consistent with the extant purposes of the clause. Because 
Senate activity continues during the typically short intrasession re-
cesses, unfilled vacancies do not threaten the shutdown of the gov-
ernment. Moreover, statutory alternatives such as succession and 
holdover provisions keep the government running smoothly even in 
the event of such vacancies. Because these changes demonstrate 
how limited the original purposes of the clause have become in to-
day's political environment, courts should confine presidential 
power to make recess appointments to the type of recess that most 
consistently reflects the Framers' understanding of how presidents 
would use the power, the intersession recess. 
